Nikolai Dmitrievich Yakovlev (1898-1972) - Soviet military leader, Marshal of Artillery. Commander-in-Chief of the country's Air Defense Forces (1955–1960)

Here is another evidence of the outstanding role of Beria in the defense of the Caucasus, and again - without a single word about who organized the following. The head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army, Marshal of Artillery Yakovlev, writes in his

memoirs: “... Simultaneously with the Battle of Stalingrad, a grandiose battle for the Caucasus unfolded. Moreover, on a huge front stretching from the Black to the Caspian Sea. And if the supply of weapons and ammunition to our troops in the Stalingrad region was

difficult, then the Caucasian epic in this respect was generally unsurpassed in its complexity ...

The supply of arms and ammunition to the troops defending here ... had to go in a roundabout way - through Central Asia, Krasnovodsk, Baku ...

However, the transports

were moving... The industrial enterprises of Transcaucasia also worked with a huge load. Under the leadership of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan (whose work was led by Beria - ***S.K.) ,*** they switched to military production and gave the front thousands of guns, mortars and ammunition.

It's hard to believe, but it happened. Somehow I was informed that something similar to an equipment factory had been created in Baku. And on the basis of ... urban waste. And in Tbilisi, the building of the slaughterhouse was adapted for this. And at such and such "factories" for five months of work, 647 thousand hand grenades, 1.2 million mines, 549.5 thousand artillery

shells were equipped! Yakovlev exclaims: “Is this not a manifestation of the selfless devotion of the working people of Transcaucasia to their socialist Mother

Yes, that's

right. But this is also another proof of how Beria skillfully organized these workers during the war. This is also proof that ***he ,*** the political leader of Transcaucasia, before the war brought up the masses of the Caucasus as citizens of a large country, citizens of the USSR. In the Caucasus, he

was his own, because the Caucasus was his own. In any case, Beria would have given all his best in the Caucasus to the end, as well as on any other sector of the front, where Stalin would have sent him. However, in the Caucasus, Beria defended not only the great homeland - the Soviet Union, but also the "small" homeland. So, for the mobilization of Transcaucasia for the struggle, the Caucasian Beria was an ideal figure in every respect. He was born here, he was here like a fish in water, he had authority, he relied on people he had found and promoted in his time.

Sergo Beria with his mother (left) and wife (right)

Sergo Beria with his wife and daughter

Beria stayed in the Caucasus for less than a month, but he saved the Caucasus. Alas, this great victory of his in the name of Russia was turned upside down after 1953 - they say, Beria almost surrendered the Caucasus.

Beria's son Sergo, a worthy son of a worthy father, was then next to him, he himself took part in the defense of the Caucasus, and what he said about Beria's role in this defense is completely historical:

“Father arrived at the front at a critical moment, when the command was in complete confusion. The Germans are quite

deeply penetrated into the rear, captured the Klukhorsky, Marukhsky, Mamisonsky passes ... Together with comrades from the General Staff, with the huge support of the local population, my father managed to normalize the

situation ... ”Let's pay attention to the train of thought and the style of Beria's son. He does not write arrogantly: "his father managed to normalize the situation," but he emphasizes: "together with his comrades from the General Staff with the enormous support of the local population ..." As you can see, Beria managed to convey to Sergo his attitude to the matter: only collective efforts ensure success, but these efforts must unite the leader.

And here is another assessment, which is worth a lot not only because of who ***it*** was given, but also because of ***when*** it was given. In the summer of 1953, when Beria was arrested and publicly defamed, his comrade General Maslennikov, outraged by an article published in the journal Military Thought, sent a letter to the editor, where he wrote:

“... the authors only casually and extremely briefly mention the enormous creative work and fundamental political organizational measures that Comrade Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria carried out, who created a radical change that changed the whole situation, despite the extremely difficult situation that had developed on the Caucasian fronts by August 1942. A similar description of the activities of Comrade L.P. Beria does not give an exhaustive picture of all the activities that were carried out under the personal and direct leadership of Comrade Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria ... ”To write ***this*** when Beria was officially declared an enemy of the people is ... Well, it’s clear how

this should be regarded. Maslennikov showed himself as a man of honor both in a letter to the editors of Military Thought in 1953, and in the fact that in 1954 he preferred his own bullet to the temple to bullying and defamation of the Khrushchevites after his arrest. During the war, many representatives of Stalin visited different fronts and at different times:

Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Voroshilov, Malenkov, Kaganovich ... Someone had a greater influence on the situation, someone less. Kaganovich, by the way, at the end of 1942 spent more than a month in Tbilisi, and there was some sense in this, although not always and not in everything - in contrast to the unmistakable actions of Lavrenty Beria.

The role of Beria in the defense of the Soviet Transcaucasus in the still unwritten objective history of the war should be highlighted. Perhaps in no other military case has the individual so clearly imposed his influence on the events, powerfully contributing to the collective success. And

it's time to admit it!

LATER Beria was sent south again - in March 1943, on the instructions of Stalin, he, as a member of the GKO, traveled to the Caucasus and Kuban to help prepare for the offensive operation in the spring of 1943. The offensive began and developed successfully. It is significant at the same time that just in the spring of 1943, and just in the sky of the Kuban, the Soviet Air Force for the first time won air superiority. This was the merit of Beria - as the organizer of military production in the Soviet rear.

TASKS of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. During the war, the Berias were not limited to the visible front line - there were fronts, both invisible and "behind the front". But before talking about them, I will briefly touch on the accusations of Lavrenty Pavlovich of the notorious “deportation” of peoples in 1944, when Chechens were evicted from the Caucasus, Tatars from the Crimea,

and someone else. Firstly, it was dangerous to keep in the rear - in 1944 - the masses of the disloyal, accustomed to weapons, collaborating with the invaders for purely military reasons. Secondly, those who survived ***the German-Tatar*** occupation of the Crimea did not resent the abrupt decision of Stalin and Beria. And the Tatars themselves were rather glad that they were just being evicted not to Kolyma, but to Central Asia - despite the fact that, according to the laws of wartime, tens of thousands of ***male*** Tatars, and, above all, of military age, were subject to court-martial and execution for treason Motherland. Indeed, in the autumn of 1941, almost all the Tatars of the Red Army in the divisions that covered the Crimean isthmus deserted, and then served the

Germans. The tragedy of the Crimean partisans is also deliberately hushed up today. And in the spring of 1942 they massively died of starvation only because the Tatar guides who participated in the laying of partisan

food bases, gave these bases to the Germans. I will keep silent about the atrocities of the Tatar guards of the prisoner-of-war camps - I would have to reproduce such terrible pictures that even paper would not endure.

Thirdly, one should not forget about the semi-tragedy, semi-drama of hundreds of thousands of Japanese Americans who were preventively sent by the US authorities to reservations during World War II ***without much need ,*** unlike the situation in the continental rear of warring Russia. As for the

Chechens, it is enough to recall their ***mass*** behavior after 1991 to doubt both the correctness of the current accusers of Stalin and Beria, and the correctness of those who returned the Chechens to their mountains.

And now - about the invisible fronts ...

Seventh victory
1941–1945. The organizer of the fight behind enemy lines

IN THE FIRST period of the war, Beria had to create a front of reserve armies and recreate the Transcaucasian Front. But there were three more "fronts" on which Beria fought before the war, during the war, and even

after it. The first is the “invisible front” behind the visible front line, reconnaissance. The second front - also without a front line, this is partisan and sabotage work in the German rear. On the third, especially difficult front, there was a struggle against the nationalist underground and gangs of nationalists in the Baltic states and Western Ukraine. About the "front" against the nationalists, I will limit myself to mentioning him, although a separate documentary study can be written about this hypostasis of Beria and his victories on this path. Let me dwell a little on intelligence and the partisan

movement ... After the unification of the NKVD and the NKGB into a single people's commissariat with the beginning of the war, Beria again supervised foreign intelligence, or rather, ***intelligence .*** Below are three intelligence stories known from the words of Zoya Voskresenskaya, a ripe Russian beauty, a colonel in foreign intelligence. She began working in intelligence in the late 1920s and before the war was part of the leadership of the G

Zoya Ivanovna knew a lot, participating in many ways ... In the middle of 1940, the head of the 5th (INO) department of the NKVD GUGB, Pavel Fitin, instructed Rybkina to "unwind" an experienced Abwehr agent, the headquarters of the captain of the tsarist army, Alexander Nelidov. At first, he resisted, however, in the end, he gave up and provided valuable information. The operation with Nelidov continued after the division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB in February 1941, and when, on July 20, 1941, the people's commissariats were again united under the leadership of Beria, he ordered Nelidov ... to release, cheer up and offer to move to neutral Turkey, Nelidov was well acquainted with, so that act there as an intelligence officer of the NKVD. Nelidov was

hotel "Moscow", began to prepare for a business trip abroad. It is alleged that Beria allegedly "did not trust anyone." But to authorize the direction ***beyond the cordon*** in the conditions of the successful German offensive ***of the former trusted employee of Admiral*** Canaris is, you know ... The story with Nelidov ended,

however, sadly. Apparently, he was frightened by unexpected trust, his psyche was broken by a wasted life, which he no longer had the strength to start again. Nelidov hanged himself - right in the comfortable room of the Moskva Hotel. It turned out that Beria believed in Nelidov more than he could believe himself. Rybkina, in October 1941, was preparing for separation

from her husband, a major intelligence officer Boris Rybkin-Yartsev. The husband, under the legal cover of an embassy adviser, was heading to Sweden, the wife - to the German rear. And this is how it happened next - according to the memoirs of Zoya Ivanovna:

“On the eve of his ***(husband’s — S.K.)*** departure, everything turned upside down in my fate. The Commissar called me and asked what I was doing. I said that I was getting ready to go to work in the rear. "As who?" - "Railway watchman at the crossing." The People's Commissar laughed: “The Germans will arrest and shoot such a watchman. You need to go to Sweden ”...

I had to hand over cases ... A few days later, the two of us were already flying on a“ duck ”(U-2) to

Arkhangelsk ...” Beria's style was well manifested here too. He disposed of the fate of Rybkina both humanely - as far as it was possible in wartime conditions, and professionally. Rybkina's feminine brilliance programmed an immediate interest in her for the SD - even if she had been sent not as a watchman, but as a waitress in an officer's casino. And the increased attention of the special services is a prerequisite for certain failure. In Sweden, Rybkina was on the spot.

Third story...

Zoya Ivanovna Voskresenskaya (1907–1992) was a Soviet spy and children's writer. Colonel. From 1935 to 1939 he was deputy resident of the NKVD intelligence in Finland. Then in the central apparatus of the Soviet foreign intelligence - a leading analyst on Germany.

Pavel Mikhailovich Fitin (1907-1971) - head of the foreign Intelligence of the USSR (INO GUGB NKVD-NKGB) (1939–1946). Lieutenant General (1945)

Sidor Artemyevich (Artyomovich) Kovpak (1887-1967) - Soviet military leader, statesman and public figure. During the Great Patriotic War - commander of the Putivl partisan detachment (later - the Sumy partisan unit, even later - the 1st Ukrainian partisan division), member of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Ukraine, major general. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union

Pavel Anatolyevich Sudoplatov (1907-1996) - From October 1941 to January 1942 - head of the 2nd department of the NKVD of the USSR. From January 1942 to April 1946, head of the 4th department of the NKVD-NKGB of the USSR

In 1942, NKVD intelligence resident in Sweden Boris Yartsev (“Kin”) and his employee Zoya Rybkina established a communication channel with the Red Capella group in Berlin through a Swedish industrialist who often visited the Reich on commercial matters. And suddenly a message comes from the Center about the arrest of the Red Chapel. The center believed that this was the result of a provocation by the liaison officer, and in order to check him, he ordered "Kin" to send him back to Berlin to communicate with the notorious

"double", which the Center knew for sure that he was working for the Germans. After analyzing the situation, Rybkin and Voskresenskaya came to the conclusion that the “Director” was an honest person, and to send him back to Berlin would be doomed to death. The Center sharply dismissed the objections: "Follow the instructions." Repeated request - and a new rude shout. Then Keane decided to turn to Beria - with a request to cancel the instructions of the head office, not to destroy a person. A couple of days later, the answer came: “The Director’s sending to Berlin is canceled, he was ordered to stop all connection".

This is how the real Beria worked with people. The one whom the “general of democracy” Volkogonov called a “ghoul” and a soulless “monster”. And Beria, on the contrary, was a sensitive, although absolutely without lisping, person. Knowing this, “Kin”-Rybkin decided to appeal directly to him over the head of his immediate superiors.

In that war, Beria also had one more front without a front line - partisan and reconnaissance and sabotage. With the outbreak of the war, a number of large partisan formations formed around strong popular leaders - Kovpak, Fedorov-Chernigovsky, Begma ... However, the main organized struggle behind enemy lines was carried out by the NKVD detachments of Beria. Already then they were overgrown with new people on the spot, they grew stronger, but the core was the KGB.

To organize a reconnaissance and sabotage "front", Beria picked up a strong team at the hand of the most experienced master of special operations of the NKVD, General Sudoplatov. The resolution of the Central Committee on the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops was adopted on July 18, 1941, but already on July 5, 1941, by order of the NKVD of the USSR, a Special Group was formed under the People's Commissar, headed by Sudoplatov. Deputies were appointed such KGB "bison" as "Yasha" Serebryansky, Maklyarsky, Drozdov, Mordvinov, Gudimovich, Orlov. On October 3, 1941, the Special Group was reorganized into an independent 2nd department of the NKVD while maintaining the direct subordination of Beria, and on January 18, 1942, the 2nd department was deployed into the 4th department of the NKVD with the expansion of tasks and powers. Beria's line

was here, as always, clear and appropriate to the situation: 1) The war began - you need to have a leadership group

special operations. 2) By autumn it becomes clear that the war is for a long time. And the group expands to a department. And then - to management.

In the summer of 1941, Colonel Orlov formed the 25,000th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade for Special Purposes (OMSBON) of the NKVD of the USSR. It has become a true forge of reconnaissance and sabotage personnel for special squads and special groups. The names of “partisans” Medvedev, Vaupshasov, Stekhov, Prokopyuk are associated with OMSBON… it is reported that in July

1941 “a commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was created to ensure the preparation of the party underground and the formation of partisan detachments”, and from August 1941, a special department for the leadership of the partisan movement began to operate in the People’s Commissariat of Defense, but it “in ceased to exist at the beginning of December, ”because Stalin ordered the creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command. And further: “However, in January 1942, when the formation of departments and departments of this headquarters was in full swing with the help of the General Staff ... the Supreme

Command

ordered to stop all this work ... In such an unexpected turn of affairs, the influence of L.P. Beria. He managed to convince I.V. Stalin in the inexpediency of creating special bodies to control partisan detachments "from the people", because, Beria assured, the activities of such partisans are spontaneous, fragmented ... and cannot give the expected operational effect. Such results, in his opinion, are only possible for qualified saboteurs, for the training and guidance of which there are special bodies ... ”First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus P.K. Ponomarenko considered Beria’s point of view to be “the most harmful”, and later he “lived through” the creation of the TsPShD in the eleventh month of the war - May 30, 1942, under his leadership. But Beria was right. Bureaucrats in uniform from the General

Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense failed to start the "big" war. Now they've failed as well.

guerrilla war. It was January 1942, but the General Staff "in full swing" was still only forming the TsSHPD. And Beria's subordinate, captain of the State Security Service Dmitry Medvedev, already on September 4, 1941, at the head of the special detachment of the NKVD of the USSR "Mitya", went to the Bryansk forests. Medvedev conducted a number of operations there and in Belarus, returned to Moscow on January 12, 1942, received his first Order of Lenin on February 17 and began to prepare for a new drop already near Rovno.

Medvedev's actions in the autumn and winter of 1941 became bright, but only one of many pages in the general folder of files of the 2nd department and the 4th department of the NKVD. And the General Staff "formed" everything, and the head of the Main Directorate for the formation and staffing of the Red Army, Shchadenko, slipped Stalin the stupidest draft orders "on the formation of partisan armies." But even the name of our most famous "non-Chekist" partisan commander, the future twice Hero of the Soviet Union Sidor Artemovich Kovpak, became known to Stalin for the first time from the report of Chekist Beria dated November 21, 1941. This was the first news of Kovpak's actions, and the report of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs was not entirely correct: "Kolpak's partisan detachment." That is, the real result was given by the People's Commissariat of Beria. It is clear why Stalin agreed with him - the Moscow clerks were only "forming" their headquarters, and the Chekists were already undermining the German headquarters!

How did Beria understand the tasks of the war behind enemy lines? The main thing is to contribute to the speedy expulsion of the Nazi troops from the USSR with the minimum possible losses and the maximum possible effect. Therefore, he saw the war behind the front line as a network of continuous special sabotage and reconnaissance operations organized by professionals and carried out by professionals with, of course, the support of the people in the occupied territories. Beria himself was a professional in special operations, and he had experience in counter-partisan actions - in the Transcaucasus in the 1920s and 1930s, the OGPU plenipotentiary had every opportunity to gain such experience! Moreover, it is impossible to explain Beria’s desire to lead the war behind enemy lines by the fact that he allegedly sought to

brag to

Stalin also "partisan" with their merits. Beria already had enough things to do above her throat, which means that there were enough successes, because for Beria, doing a job meant doing it successfully. But

Ponomarenko ... Panteleimon Ponomarenko wanted, of course, a speedy victory over the enemy no less than Lavrenty Beria. But Ponomarenko was a party "general", and even temporarily without an army - Belarus was occupied. Ponomarenko had to show Stalin that the Belarusian land was burning, they say, Comrade Stalin, under the feet of the Nazi invaders, and our own party, that is, Ponomarenko, was organizing the movement of people's avengers. So whose position was principled and constructive? In the END, the TsSHPD was created under Ponomarenko's hand. But let's compare two dates.

The TsShPD was formed on May 30, 1942, and already on May 18, 1942, Sidor Kovpak received his first gold star. He deserved it without the "guidelines" of the head of the TsSHPD, but not without practical help with weapons, personnel, and assignments from the Beria department. If all work behind the front was tied only to the 4th Directorate of the NKVD, then the war in the enemy rear would have

been more efficient, without losing its nationwide character. Beria did not rule out, but welcomed the expansion and development of the NKVD special detachments at the expense of "local resources", but the Chekists, the commanders of such detachments, skillfully maintained the proportions between the number of detachments and the effectiveness of their combat work. They knew that professionals do not fight by numbers, but by skill, even at the front. And behind the front line ... Professional security officer Stanislav Vaupshasov, finding himself alone in an acute situation, from

behind the bushes instantly

shot six punishers at once, carelessly, unprofessionally, who had come out in a crowd into the clearing. Not in a Hollywood action movie, but in life it is extremely

difficult.

The professional Chekist Beria had a clear line and followed it consistently. And Ponomarenko, an amateur in this matter, rushed from the "concept" of small detachments to the recognition of the usefulness of formations of several thousand fighters, such as Kovpakovsky. In July 1942, Ponomarenko prepared a draft order of the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR, that is, Stalin, on intensifying partisan struggle, where

stated: “Experience shows that large partisan formations, sometimes reaching several thousand people, are inactive, easily detected by the enemy, poorly controlled ...” Ponomarenko proposed “to stop the practice of creating large partisan formations.” Kovpak at that time was conducting another raid of the two thousandth formation, Alexei Fedorov Chernigovskiy increased his formation to the same date. Partisan territories arose, led by commanders who advanced without the knowledge of Ponomarenko. In reality, everything was determined on the ground by life, and not by pieces of paper TsSHPD.

Dmitry Nikolaevich Medvedev (1898-1954) - commander of a special detachment, Hero of the Soviet Union, staff member of the OGPU of the NKVD of the USSR, colonel, writer

Stanislav Alekseevich Vaupshasov (1899-1976) - Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union, colonel. From September 1941 - commander of the OMSBON battalion of the NKVD of the USSR. From March 1942 to July 1944 - commander of the special detachment "Local

Most of the detachments and formations that operated effectively had NKVD cadres as their core. These were not just people with weapons, but people who had been trained, who had targeted tasks, radio communications with Moscow. And as needed, they "overgrown" with local

residents. Heroes of the Soviet Union "partisans" Dmitry Medvedev, Stanislav Vaupshasov, Dmitry Emlyutin, Viktor Karasev, Alexander Saburov, Nikolai Prokopyuk, Evgeny Mirkovsky are personnel security officers. The heroes of the Soviet Union, the leaders of the underground centers Viktor Lyagin, Ivan Kudrya, Viktor Molodtsov are also personnel Chekists. And this is only a part of the glorious, heroic names of the glorious subordinates of the People's Commissar-Chekist Beria.

Dmitry Vasilyevich Emlyutin (1907-1966) - Hero of the Soviet Union (1942), one of the leaders of the partisan movement in the Bryansk forests, colonel

Nikolai Arkhipovich Prokopyuk (1902-1975) - head of the partisan formation "Hunters" during the Great Patriotic War, colonel, Hero of the Soviet Union (1944)

Viktor Alexandrovich Karasyov (1918-1991) - Major, Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). From 1935 to 1941 he served in the Border Troops of the NKVD of the USSR. From February 1943 to February 1945, as a commander of a special detachment (grew up to a partisan formation), he was behind the front line.

Alexander Nikolaevich Saburov (1908–1974) - Soviet military leader, major general, commander of a partisan unit, Hero of the Soviet Union (1942). In 1936-1938 he served in the NKVD, on the eve of the Great Patriotic War - the head of the fire department in Kyiv, then the deputy head of the Kyiv courses of the management of forced labor camps and colonies UITLK

Viktor Alexandrovich Lyagin (1908-1943) - Soviet intelligence officer, captain, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). From July 1939 to June 1941 he was on a business trip through foreign intelligence in the United States. From July 1941 to March 1943 he headed the reconnaissance and sabotage center in the city of Nikolaev

Evgeny Ivanovich Mirkovsky (1904-1992) - Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union (1944). From 1927 to 1940 he served in the border troops on the western border. From March 1942 to September 1944 - commander of the reconnaissance and sabotage group "Walkers", which grew into a partisan detachment named after F. E. Dzerzhinsky, operating on the territory of the Oryol, Kiev, Zhytomyr, Chernihiv, Volyn, Gomel, Rivne and Brest regions, and also in Poland

Ivan Danilovich Kudrya (1912-1942) - Soviet intelligence officer, Hero of the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the Second World War, foreign intelligence officer Ivan Kudrya was left in Kyiv to organize and lead reconnaissance and sabotage groups. He took part in the preparation and conduct of combat operations of seven sabotage groups in German-occupied Kyiv



Vladimir Alexandrovich Molodtsov (1911-1942) - Soviet intelligence officer, captain, Hero of the Soviet Union (posthumously). During the Great Patriotic War, he led the reconnaissance and sabotage center in occupied Odessa

Maria Borisovna Osipova 1908–1999), Nadezhda Viktorovna Troyan (1921–2011) and Elena Grigorievna Mazanik (1914–1996)

In 1943, Gauleiter of Belarus Kube was blown up in his own bed in Minsk. Three women - Elena Mazanik, Maria Osipova and Nadezhda Troyan on November 4, 1943 received the stars of the Heroes of the Soviet Union for this operation. But the operation itself is the development of NKVD operatives in cooperation with the GRU of the General Staff.

The acts of vengeance in Rovno of the Hero of the Soviet Union Nikolai Kuznetsov (“Paul Siebert”) were developed by professionals from the Lubyanka, these acts were prepared by Dmitry Medvedev and Alexander Lukin, also professionals from the Lubyanka, but Nikolai Kuznetsov himself was a professional. And also from the

Lubyanka! Yes, and in the leadership of the TsSHPD, as well as the republican partisan headquarters, there were mainly representatives of the NKVD. Nevertheless, Beria, by his directive of July 13, 1942, forbade the transfer to the headquarters of the partisan movement of personnel of reconnaissance and sabotage groups of special forces operating in the German rear, reconnaissance residencies, couriers and messengers. He banned and

transmission of correspondence on the partisan formations of the NKVD (summaries, dispatches, reports,

radiograms) ... Lavrenty Pavlovich is reproached for this today, but the decision was correct. Everything that Beria kept in the competence of the NKVD was extremely “subtle matters”, and it was unreasonable to give them into inept hands. And Beria here did not care about his own ambitions, but about the strictest secrecy and the safety of those people who lived every day in the enemy's rear under the threat of failure. Even P.K. Ponomarenko in a letter to the Secretary of the Smolensk Regional Party Committee D.M. Popov on February 10, 1943 noted that “some comrades organize district committees in the occupied territory according to the usual type, arrange meetings, meetings, hear reports from political workers of brigades and detachments, and at the same time do not pay attention to the construction of a deeply secret Bolshevik underground.” Could such "organizers" of illegal work be trusted with intelligence networks, personnel, communications?

On the fiery and "invisible" fronts of the Great Patriotic War, Lavrenty Beria won many victories, but even all of his outstanding victories on the military fronts and "special" fronts not only fade, but fade into the background compared to what the GKO member did and Deputy Chairman of the GKO L.P. Beria for the organization of the Soviet military industrial rear.

Eighth victory
1941–1945. Organizer of the military industrial rear

THE MAIN meaning of the life of all honest citizens of Soviet society who were not at the front during the war was determined by the slogan: "Rear to the front." And the main line of Beria's fate in the Great Patriotic War was his work in the State Defense Committee. Here is how it is reported in the collection of documents “Lavrenty Beria. 1953, published by the International Foundation for Democracy, this is what even his haters admit to Lavrenty Pavlovich:

“By the Decree of the State Defense Committee of February 4, 1942 on the distribution of responsibilities between its members, Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of aircraft and engines, the formation of the Air Force, in addition, in the future (not in the future, but already before that ! - ***S. K.),*** Beria was entrusted with monitoring the implementation of decisions on the production of weapons, mortars, ammunition, tanks, as well as monitoring the work of three people's commissariats: the oil, coal industry and communications. In 1944, Stalin appointed Beria Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee and Chairman of the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee, which considered all current issues. Chronologically, the

period covered here is only from the beginning of 1942 (and it was also the year 1941!), however, the role of Lavrenty Pavlovich in organizing the war economy is reflected here quite correctly, although not completely. The duties of those who "failed", Stalin shifted to Beria. A person is “loaded” as much as he can carry. And Beria carried as much as they loaded him. That's where they loaded it.

Since the beginning of the

war! Anastas Mikoyan in the memoirs published in the "perestroika" years,

distorting the history of the establishment of the State Defense Committee, he argued:

“Voznesensky (Chairman of the State Planning Commission, - ***S.K.)*** asked to be given leadership in the production of weapons and ammunition, which ... was accepted. The leadership for the production of tanks was entrusted to

Molotov, and the aviation industry and aviation in general - to Malenkov. For Beria, the maintenance of order within the country and the fight against desertion were left ...

"So, in the presentation of Mikoyan, in a difficult time for Russia, everyone was on the shoulder , and Beria was not entrusted with anything more responsible than catching punks in the gateways and deserters in the forests. In reality, from the very beginning of the war, the People's Commissariat for Armaments under the GKO line subordinated Beria, and the former deputy commissar for armaments Novikov wrote about Beria in the 1970s: "... he personally answered for us before Stalin." Novikov recalls that at the end of July 1941 he had a sharp argument with Beria about whether the Izhevsk plant could produce five thousand rifles in three months. Novikov insisted on writing a term of seven months. However, already in November 1941, the Izhevsk people produced four thousand, and by the end of the summer of 1942 - ***twelve thousand*** rifles per day! And Novikov boasted to Voroshilov, who arrived in Izhevsk, that "we have rifles flowing around the clock from week to week, from month to month." Apparently, Izhevsk reached the level of five thousand by the end of 1941, that is, in less than five months.

Vladimir Nikolayevich Novikov (1907-2000) - Soviet statesman and economic figure, Major General of the Engineering Artillery Service (1944), Hero of Socialist Labor (1942). In 1941-1948 - Deputy People's Commissar (Minister) of Armaments of the USSR

Boris Glebovich Muzrukov (1904-1979) - Soviet business executive. Major General of the Tank Engineering Service, twice Hero of Socialist Labor (1943, 1949). Laureate of the Lenin Prize and two Stalin Prizes

As a member of the GKO, Beria was responsible for the production of almost all types of weapons, including mortars. This type of weapon before the war was not appreciated by all the military, despite the obvious combat effectiveness and simplicity. Now mortars were needed in unlimited quantities. And on September 5, 1941, Beria

creates in the NKVD a new, 7th special department of the NKVD of the USSR for the security service of mortar weapons, which lasted until November 14, 1942, headed by I.M. Tkachenko. Last but not least, in the supervision of the NKVD, the reason is found for the fact that, despite all the losses in industrial potential, the production of mortars by industry in 1941 increased by 4.34 times compared to the peaceful year of 1940 - from 38 thousand to 165.1 thousand! This was the style of Beria, expressed most concisely and convincingly - in numbers. Beria oversaw both the production of ammunition and aviation production, although

Malenkov was officially responsible for it. The latter possessed organizational acumen, however, not of Beria's standard. Therefore, Malenkov was often insured by Beria. Beria was also responsible for the tanks, and there is a competent testimony of Boris Glebovich Muzrukov, an outstanding

industrial organizer, twice Hero of Socialist Labor, about how this happened. He received his first Star on January 20, 1943 as the director of Uralmash for the production of tanks, and the second - on October 29, 1949, as the director of plant No. 817 for our first plutonium for the first RDS-1 atomic bomb. It was Beria who attracted him to "atomic" affairs, who knew Muzrukov from the war along the "tank" line. From June 1955 to March 1974, Boris Glebovich was the director of the largest center for the development of nuclear weapons in Arzamas-16 (KB-11, later the All-Union Research Institute of Experimental Physics). And much later, Muzrukov confidentially told the "atomic"

colleagues:

“At first, the tank industry was supervised by Molotov. It was bad ... The aviation workers (they were, in fact, "led" by Beria, - ***S.K.)*** have energy, fuel, and raw materials, while the tankers - poor, poor. We - asked Malyshev (People's Commissar of the tank industry ***- S.K.)*** to ask Stalin to change our boss, and he changed ... Appointed Beria as chief of the tank industry. Of course, it has become better with raw materials, energy, fuel, food ... "

In 1965, when asked about his military impressions of Beria, Boris Glebovich replied: “What can

be said about a person who is much higher than you and with whom you have a relationship - a clear and severe submission? There are no personal impressions, as far as the case is concerned, to the extent that

was required for supervision, competence was. He was tough, but also helped. I don't know the time when he would sleep or be absent, call at any time of the day or night, and he is always there. Khrushchev's party bureaucrats recommended that an article about Lavrenty Pavlovich be cut with a razor from the 5th volume of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia. But Lavrenty Beria did too much for Russia in his life to remove him, if not from official history, then from all volumes of the TSB published before June 26, 1953, the day of his arrest, with a wave of the hand. Therefore, in volume 12 of the TSB-2, signed for printing on May 28, 1952, on page 318 in the article "State Defense Committee" and after June 26, 1953, it was possible, taking volume 12 in any library of the Union, to read :

"The Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of September 30, 1943 noted the special merits of the members of the GOKO in strengthening the production of weapons and ammunition and supplying the army in difficult wartime conditions: in the field of tank production - the deputy chairman of the GOKO V.M. Molotov; in the field of production of weapons and ammunition - a member of the GOKO L.P. Beria; in the field of production of aircraft and engines for them - a member of the GOKO G.M. Malenkov; in the field of setting up the matter of supplying the Soviet Army with food, fuel and clothing allowances - a member of the GOKO A.I. Mikoyan. By this decree, they were awarded the titles of Heroes of Socialist Labor. Let us note that Nikolai Voznesensky, allegedly Stalin's "favorite", who is given the image of "the organizer of the war economy", did not receive the Hero Star either then - in 1943, or later. As for the rest of the awardees, their contribution to the organization of the Victory undoubtedly deserved the awards they received. However, Molotov and Malenkov earned their Gold Stars, however, not quite for what Stalin officially awarded them for. Beria received the Star of the Hero only for weapons and ammunition, although Lavrenty Pavlovich now and then had to insure the official "aviator" Malenkov, and, as we see, the "tankman" Molotov was completely replaced. At the same time, Beria also oversaw the oil, coal and railway people's commissariats!

ACTUALLY, there was not a single large, state level, case during the war, to which Beria would not have been related in one way or another. In the spring of 1942, a very difficult situation was created on the railways: there were no tracks in the liberated areas, no infrastructure of stations, and “traffic jams” in the rear ... On March 13, 1942, a special GKO group was formed, which was entrusted with all responsibility for transportation by rail. The composition of the group: Kaganovich, Beria, Malenkov, several employees of the People's Commissariat of Railways and several employees of VOSO - military communications service. The operational, “technical” side of the matter is on the latter, but who is responsible?

On August 23, 1943, the Committee was formed under the Council of People's Commissars of the SSR for the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from German occupation, chaired by Malenkov. Members: Beria, Mikoyan, Voznesensky and Andreev. The names were listed in order of responsibility. Knowing this, one can understand who was who in this Committee. And all this - not in exchange, but ***in addition*** to the already loaded on Beria!

Since 1944, Beria, along with Molotov, became Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee I.V. Stalin. At that time, all the fullness of state power was concentrated in the State Defense Committee - it was an emergency body of wartime. In reality, this meant that Beria became the second person in the state after Stalin. Even at the beginning of the war, Molotov was more busy not with operational, but with foreign policy affairs, and even more so in the second half of the war ... There is such a thing as the

“Hamburg account”. It traces its history back to absolutely closed world wrestling championships, which were periodically organized by circus wrestlers at the beginning of the 20th century, having rented a circus in Hamburg for

this. Wrestlers' entrepreneurs arranged their ratings in a way that was beneficial for circus commerce, so often the strongest were forced to lose to the weakest. And the carpet masters wanted to know the true strength of each. So they fought in an empty circus - no fools.

Among professionals, only the “Hamburg” champion was valued. And if you build a "Hamburg rating" of personal merits in the Great Patriotic War, then the absolute "champion" is obvious - this is Joseph Stalin. The second step must be given to Lavrenty Beria!

On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in Moscow, the exhibition “At the Headquarters of the Victory” was held with almost official status. On the poster of the exhibition, the first among dozens of portraits of the leading figures of that war - state and military, was a portrait of Stalin. But a portrait of Beria was rightfully placed next to him - officially to this day

he has not been

rehabilitated.

What can I say? The Irony of Fate? No, perhaps ... Rather, it is evidence of the schizophrenia of the current "epoch", when the great son of Russia is considered a "state criminal" and "executioner", and state criminals and executioners like Gorbachev and Yeltsin are honored and awarded the highest orders.

Ninth victory
1945–1949. Russia does itself: the solution of the nuclear problem

On MAY 9, 1945, the war in Europe ended only for the soldiers, and the end of the Second World War was nearing - on September 2, 1945, the act of surrender of Japan was signed. However, Soviet Russia was threatened with a new aggression - atomic. On July 16, 1945, the world's first atomic bomb exploded in Alamogordo, a desert area in the US state of New Mexico. It was a test explosion, the success of which was known to a limited circle of people in the USA, in England, and, thanks to foreign intelligence, in the USSR. And two days before the start of the offensive of the Soviet Army in Manchuria, on the orders of US President Truman and without consulting the Soviet Union, Japan was subjected to atomic bombing. On August 6, 1945, the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, and on August 8, on Nagasaki. Thus, America demonstrated to the whole world that it had acquired an atomic

monopoly. And almost immediately began both diplomatic and public atomic blackmail of the Soviet Union. US Secretary of War Henry Stimson was not shy about declaring that America could now negotiate with Russia by "defiantly shaking" the atomic bomb. University of Texas professor R. Montgomery wrote: “Within 24 hours we can destroy 75 million Russians without losing even a hundred people ... If we need to destroy the Russians, then let's do it now, let's not wait three years.” The issue of eliminating the US nuclear monopoly and creating its own nuclear weapons became a matter of life and death for the USSR - literally!

Preparations for testing the first American nuclear implosion-type plutonium bomb devices. July 1945



Explosion plutonium implosion-type bomb in 0.016 seconds after detonation. The size of the plasma ball is about 200 meters

Stalin and Beria knew from the autumn of 1941 that nuclear work was being carried out in England and the USA. On September 28, 1942, GKO order No. 2352ss "On the organization of work on uranium" was adopted. On February 11, 1943, by GKO order No. GOKO-2872ss, the daily management of work on the “uranium bomb or uranium fuel” was entrusted to the Deputy Chairman of the SNK of the USSR and People's Commissar of the USSR Chemical Industry M.G. Pervukhin and the chairman of the Committee for Higher Education under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, authorized by the State Defense Committee for Science S.V. Kaftanov. The research was carried out by the "special laboratory of the atomic nucleus of the USSR Academy of Sciences" (Laboratory No. 2) of Professor I.V. Kurchatov.

Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov (1903-1960) - Soviet physicist, "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb. Three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1949, 1951, 1954). Academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences (1943) and Uzbek Academy of Sciences. SSR (1959), doctor of physical and mathematical sciences (1933), professor (1935). Founder and first director of the Institute of Atomic Energy (1943–1960). Chief scientific leader of the atomic problem in the USSR, one of the founders of the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Laureate of the Lenin Prize and four Stalin Prizes

Molotov was appointed the first curator of atomic work from the Politburo, but he turned out to be no more successful as a "nuclear engineer" than a "tanker". On May 19, 1944, Pervukhin sent a letter to Stalin, where he proposed "to create a Uranium Council under the GOKO" under the chairmanship of Beria. And on July 10, 1944, Pervukhin and Kurchatov sent Beria, as Deputy Chairman of the State Defense Committee, a "strictly secret" note on the development of work on the uranium problem in the USSR, to which a draft Decree of the State Defense Committee was attached. On September 29, 1944, Kurchatov wrote a separate letter to Beria, where at the end it was said: ***"... Knowing your extremely busy schedule, I, nevertheless, in view of the historical significance of the uranium problem, decided to disturb you and ask you to give instructions on such an organization of work that corresponded to the possibilities and significance of our Great State in world***

culture. Not quite an ordinary argument, and, judging by it, Kurchatov, knowing Beria only from stories so far, already understood that he was dealing with a man of broad views, and that he could be contacted, attracting not necessarily purely utilitarian, pragmatic considerations to substantiate the meaning of the problem. ... On December 3, 1944,

meetings in Stalin's office began at 19.05, and a lot of people stayed there until 20.50. But from 20.50 Stalin had three left: Beria, Malenkov and Shcherbakov, the first secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. Most likely, Stalin left them in order to calmly discuss issues related to the transfer to Moscow of the Leningrad branch of Laboratory No. 2 of the Academy of Sciences of the SSR and from Sverdlovsk - the laboratory of Professor Kikoin. All this was done in pursuance of the top secret GOKO Decree No. 7069ss adopted on that day "On urgent measures to ensure the deployment of work carried out by Laboratory No. 2 of the USSR Academy of Sciences." The last, tenth paragraph of the Resolution read: **“Assign to Comrade Beria L.P. monitoring the development of work on uranium”.** So Beria received a new task from Stalin, which at the same time was the task of the Big Country with a “short name” - the USSR.

Beria's SIGNIFICANCE for the Soviet Atomic Project can be summed up in six words: "Without Beria, there would be no Bomb." After the arrest of LB, Academician Kurchatov said exactly this about the role of Beria. More precisely, Bomb would have been made, presumably, even without Beria, but not in those

the time frame in which it was made. At that time, the deadlines were determined: to be Russia further, or not to be, because the stock of atomic bombs accumulated in the USA was accumulated

against Russia and only against Russia. The outstanding role of Beria in the elimination of the US nuclear monopoly is confirmed by a huge array of documents. Almost the entire “atomic” archive according to Beria was preserved, because the archives of the atomic department were closed even for Khrushchev’s party apparatchiks - after all, technical, not political secrets were stored in these archives. And from ***the documents*** it is clear that Beria did not carry out "general interference in the affairs of his subordinates", but led the atomic work in a competent, businesslike manner.

Since the second half of the 1990s, one of the oldest physicists of the nuclear weapons center in Arzamas-16, G.A. Goncharov (1928–2009), Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, together with retired colonel P.P. Maksimenko was engaged in the selection in secret archives, declassification and preparation for publication of documents of the Atomic Project. The work was carried out in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 17, 1995 No. 160 "On the preparation and publication of an official collection of archival documents on the history of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USSR." After studying many thousands of documents with Beria's visas, after studying the transcripts of various meetings, etc. G.A. Goncharov came to the conclusion that **Beria understood the technical issues of the Atomic Project at the level of a doctor of technical sciences!**

Formally, Beria did not have a higher education, but it is safe to say that in his youth he received basic technical training at the engineering level. His memory was excellent, his reaction was fast, his ability to analyze was outstanding, so that Beria acquired any knowledge correctly and firmly. And everyday communication with the largest specialists in the emerging atomic science and technology could replace any universities - if only there was a head on their shoulders. Beria had a head.

ON AUGUST 20, 1945, by GKO Decree No. 9887ss / op, a “Special Committee under the GKO” was created under the chairmanship

L.P. Beria with emergency powers to solve any problems of the Uranium Project. For the "direct management of research, design organizations and industrial enterprises in the use of intra-atomic energy of uranium and the production of atomic bombs," the First Main Directorate (PGU) was organized under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, subordinate to the Special Committee.

design

СТРОГО СЕКРЕТНО
(ОСОБАЯ ПАПКА)

ПРОТОКОЛ № 85
ЗАСЕДАНИЯ
Специального комитета
при Совете Министров СССР

от 26 августа 1949 г. г. Москва, Кремль

Член Специального Комитета т.т. Берия, Маленков Ванников, Первухин, Завенягин, Курчатов, Махнев.

~~ПРИСУТСТВОВАЛИ:~~

Об испытании первого экземпляра атомной бомбы.

Принять внесенный т.т. Ванниковым, Курчатовым и Первухиным проект Постановления Совета Министров Союза ССР „Об испытании атомной бомбы" и представить его на утверждение Председателя Совета Министров Союза ССР товарища Сталина И.В.

/ проект прилагается /.

Председатель
Специального Комитета
при Сов. Мин. СССР

Л. Берия

Minutes of the meeting of the Special Committee

B.L. became the head of the PSU. Vannikov, who was relieved of his duties as People's Commissar of Ammunition, and his deputies: A.P. Zavenyagin (first deputy), N.A. Borisov (from the State Planning Committee of the USSR), P.Ya. Meshik (ensuring secrecy), P.Ya. Antropov (exploration and development of uranium ore deposits) and A.G. Kasatkin (deputy people's commissar of the chemical industry). Beria knew everyone well, including Borisov, the deputy of the State Planning Committee of the USSR, from the time of war, and now he gathered under his new banner both old, tested, fighters, and new ones.

The future three times Hero of Socialist Labor, Boris Lvovich Vannikov, is a mechanical engineer with extensive experience in leadership in industry, led the People's Commissariat of Armaments, and then the People's Commissariat of Ammunition.

The future twice Hero of Socialist Labor Avraamiy Petrovich Zavenyagin is a metallurgical engineer, he knew the country's metallurgical industry well, previously led the design and construction of the largest metallurgical plants, and since 1941, being Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR L.P. Beria, supervised the construction of mining and metallurgical facilities in the NKVD. The future Hero of Socialist Labor Mikhail Georgievich Pervukhin

is an electrical engineer with extensive experience in organizational work; led the chemical industry, before that he was the people's commissar of power plants and the electrical industry.

Paragraph VII of the protocol No. 6 of the meeting of the Special Committee of September 28, 1945 provided for the organization of Bureau No. 2 as part of the Special Committee with subordination directly to Beria. The functions of the Bureau were visible from the one who headed it - the Deputy Chief of Foreign Intelligence P.A. became the head of the Bureau. Sudoplatov, and his deputies N.S. Sazykin, N.I. Eitingon and L.P. Vasilevsky. These were Beria's old employees of the NKVD of the USSR, and their involvement was not accidental, they had a serious business ahead of them - "atomic intelligence".

Boris Lvovich Vannikov (1897-1962) - Soviet statesman and military leader, one of the main participants in the Soviet atomic program, colonel general of the engineering artillery service, three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1942, 1949, 1954). In 1945–1953, he was the head of the First Main Directorate under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (since 1946, under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the organization of the production of nuclear weapons). Three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1942, 1949, 1954). Winner of two Stalin Prizes (1951, 1953). Colonel General of the Engineering and Technical Service (1944)

Mikhail Georgievich Pervukhin (1904-1978) - Soviet state, political and military figure. First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1955–1957), member of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU (from 1952 to 1957), lieutenant general of the engineering service, Hero of Socialist Labor

Avraamiy Pavlovich Zavenyagin (1901-1956) - industrial organizer, metallurgical engineer, curator of the Soviet metallurgy and nuclear project, lieutenant general (1945, Ministry of Internal Affairs). Twice Hero of Socialist Labor (1949, 1954), laureate of the Stalin Prize (1951)

Pyotr Leonidovich Kapitsa (1894-1984) was a Soviet physicist, engineer and innovator. In 1945 he was a member of the Special Committee on the Soviet Atomic Project. Nobel Prize in Physics (1978)

On December 29, 1945, by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Beria was relieved of his duties as the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, and on January 15, 1946, several lines appeared in the Izvestia newspaper in the

Chronicle section: “The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR granted the request of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR t L.P. Beria to release him from the duties of the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR due to his overload with other central work. Comrade S.N. was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Kruglov.

The essence of the other "central work" was not reported, and nothing could be reported.

At the beginning of 1946, the main directions were finally determined, and at the same time the composition and structure of

Technical Council - Academician P.L. Kapitz, not prone to activity. In November 1945, he wrote to Stalin: ***“I personally think that Comrade. Beria would have coped with his task if he had given more time and effort. He is very energetic, orients himself perfectly and quickly, distinguishes the secondary from the main well, so he does not waste time in vain, he certainly has taste for scientific issues, he grasps them well, precisely formulates his decisions ... .. I offered him to teach him physics, to come to my institute ... "***

It is significant that this is an assessment of Beria by a person who ***is not*** friendly to Beria. In the same letter, Kapitsa gives indirect but important evidence that Beria was not vindictive, and Kapitsa knew about it - otherwise he would not have added the following postscript to the letter: “PPS I would like Comrade . ***Beria got acquainted with this letter, because this is not a denunciation, but useful criticism.*** Kapitsa's whims had no objective grounds, and his advice to Beria to study the experience of organizing work when laying an underwater transatlantic telegraph cable looked ridiculous - given that it was addressed to someone who had just pulled out the organization of a military rear in the great war, and much more besides the military rear.

But the colossus had to move a huge one! The head of "atomic" work in the United States, Major General Leslie Groves in 1945 boasted:

“Any other country will need 15-20 years to create an atomic bomb. Only those who have worked on the construction of nuclear plants ... know how difficult it is and what an almost impossible precision is required. Only they also know the fact that the wrong operation of some small part will put the plant out of action for several months "...

Consultant on the Russian economy of the US War Department E. Raymond and head of the technical information department of the Kellex Corporation D.F. Hogerton reflected on the pages of the American press: “Today, Soviet industry ranks second in the world, but this is not the same industry ... Russian industry is busy,

mainly by the production of heavy rough equipment, such as steel-smelting furnaces and steam

locomotives ... The branches of Soviet industry that produce precision instruments are underdeveloped and produce low-quality products ..., the key industries for the nuclear problem in Russia lag behind the corresponding industries in Russia by an average of 22 years United States".

The American experts were not so wrong - as of the end of 1945. A little more than 340 physicists worked in the main physical institutes of the country, and about 140 physicists dealt with nuclear physics, including young scientists who had just started working. These physicists worked in 6 research institutes. A little over 100 people worked in the field of radiochemistry at 4 institutes. There was nothing to think of doing uranium radiochemistry with such a small staff. It was necessary to create new scientific centers and gather people to solve new

problems. In America, when the atomic problem was being solved, whole teams of scientists from other countries took part in the work. They brought the results of their research to the USA, and the atomic "Manhattan Project" of the USA was, in fact, international. On December 5, 1951, the chairman of the US Atomic Commission, G. Dean, at a meeting of the American Artillery Association in New York, reported that 1,200 physicists were working directly for the atomic energy program in the USA. The Soviet Union had to rely almost exclusively on its own forces to solve the atomic problem. True, a number of German specialists worked in the Atomic Project in the 1940s, and Professor Nikolaus Riehl was even awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor, but the participation of the Germans was not decisive, altho



Nikolai Vasilievich Riehl (German: Nikolaus Riehl, 1901–1990) was a German and Soviet physicist and radiochemist, participant in the Soviet nuclear project, Hero of Socialist Labor (1949). Laureate of the Stalin Prize of the first degree

By the end of 1945, more than 50 research organizations were involved in work on the atomic problem in the USSR, and by the end of 1946, about 100 research institutes and laboratories, physical, chemical, biological, medical, and engineering, were conducting intensive research. according to a single research plan.

Stalin's idea that the cadres who mastered the technique decide everything remained true, especially for the Atomic problem.

But the central task turned out to be, nevertheless, the task of obtaining the necessary quantities of weapons-grade fissile materials from uranium ore. However, only trained personnel could provide a solution to this problem. By the

beginning of work in the field of atomic energy, the United States had significant reserves of uranium ore, because it had the most powerful radium mining industry in the world - three-quarters of the world's radium production was accounted for by the United States. After the start of nuclear work, America immediately took over most of the world's uranium deposits. In the Soviet Union, by the beginning of

work on the Atomic Problem, there was only one explored deposit of uranium ore in Fergana. The uranium content of this ore was hundreds of times lower than that of ores processed in US plants. In other words, if the United States was immediately provided with uranium raw materials, then in the Soviet Union it was necessary to start with its search, with the organization of geological exploration for uranium. Now they often talk about the supposedly decisive role of the Soviet "atomic" intelligence in solving the Soviet Atomic problem ... Intelligence really did a lot, in which Beria also had a considerable merit. Although he did not lead foreign intelligence since 1943 - after the new division of the NKVD into the NKVD and the NKGB - he did a lot for the development of Soviet intelligence when he reformed the NKVD - even before the war. But any efforts of undercover intelligence could not provide information about whether there are large deposits of uranium in the USSR and, if so, where? Geological exploration was required here .

Already in 1946, about 320 geological parties were engaged in the search for uranium deposits in the USSR. By the end of 1945, geologists received the first special instruments, but this was only the beginning! By mid-1952, the USSR Ministry of Geology had over 7,000 radiometers and over 3,000 other radiometric instruments for uranium and thorium exploration. More than 900 drilling rigs, about 650 special pumps, 170 diesel power plants, 350 compressors, 300 oil engines, 1,650 vehicles, 200 tractors and many other equipment were also involved. In a dilapidated country, all this was torn off from the work of restoring the national economy, but there was no other way out - in

The United States multiplied plans for atomic bombings of dozens of major Soviet cities. I had to hurry and hurry. Uranium must not only be found - it must be mined and processed - enriched. Until 1945, there was only one mining enterprise in the USSR engaged in the extraction of uranium ore. Now the situation has changed - the mining enterprises transferred to the CCGT received 80 mobile power plants, 300 mine hoists, over 400 rock-loading machines, 320 electric locomotives, and about 6,000 vehicles. More than 800 units of chemical-technological equipment were handed over to the processing plants.

Obtaining weapons-grade uranium from extracted natural raw materials, or at least uranium suitable for a nuclear reactor producing weapons-grade plutonium, was also an extremely difficult task in all respects, including in terms of energy costs. **Dozens of other only major problems arose, not counting hundreds of minor ones, *and all* of them somehow did not fall out of Beria's field of vision - this is convincingly documented by the materials of the 11-volume collection "Soviet Atomic Project". The minutes of the meetings of the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers of the USSR testify that Beria - either as the first person in charge, or as one of those involved in this or that issue - was involved in *everything!*** Allocation of foreign currency to CCGT… Establishment in the USSR Ministry of Finance of a department to finance and control the spending of special funds, rare and precious metals… Development of deposits B-9 (code name for thorium) on the territory of the Yakutzoloto trust of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs… Production plans for P-9 (code name for uranium ore) in Poland… Construction of “plutonium” plant No. 817, plant No. 813 and providing them with personnel… Organization of production of ultra-pure graphite and highly refractory products… Operational plans for research at the Training Ground No. 2 of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - Semipalatinsk nuclear test site… Production of prototypes of high-vacuum equipment ... Works on the study of cosmic rays ... The question of the life of scientists ...

The list can go on and on, because - I will emphasize it again! - in the field of view of Lavrenty Pavlovich were practically ***all*** issues under the jurisdiction of the Special Committee. **The creation of the nuclear industry and the solution of the nuclear problem is the result of the complex efforts of hundreds of thousands of our compatriots: scientists, engineers, intelligence officers, builders, production workers, but the personal contribution to this collective success of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria must be defined as the most outstanding. This work of his was no less important for the sovereign future of the Big Country than his military work for the Victory of 1945.** Beria knew how to combine

the work of many into a single whole. And the fact that the Soviet Union liquidated the US nuclear monopoly so quickly is due to its organizational and human talent. And the elimination of the threat of the atomic dictatorship of the United States was then really a matter of life and death for Russia! Already in 1949, when the first bomb was tested, Stalin once said in a narrow circle that if we were late with our bomb for a year and a half, then we would probably “try” it on ourselves. So it would be.

About BERIA, the Curator of the Atomic Problem, it would be necessary to write - ***exclusively on the basis of documents*** - a separate, not thin volume. And in order to briefly characterize the essence of Beria's "atomic" activity, and its significance for Russia, I will turn to the evidence of major "atomic" domestic figures. These estimates cannot be challenged by anyone and in any way!

Yuli Borisovich Khariton (1904–1996) was a Soviet and Russian theoretical physicist and physical chemist. One of the leaders of the Soviet atomic bomb project. Laureate of Lenin (1956) and three Stalin Prizes (1949, 1951, 1953). Three times Hero of Socialist Labor (1949, 1951, 1954)

Academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR Yuliy Borisovich Khariton is legendary among the nuclear scientists of YuB, three times Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin and Stalin Prizes. For more than forty years, since 1946, he was the Scientific Director of Arzamas-16, the oldest Soviet nuclear weapons center. And here is what he wrote in the early 1990s in the book “On Some Myths Around the Soviet Atomic and Hydrogen Projects”:

“... The ground for various conjectures appears ... when the truth is hushed up due to political attitudes and considerations, as, for example, in the case of L.P. Beria. If there is no truth today, then there will be myths tomorrow...

It is known that at first the general management of the Soviet atomic project was carried out by V.M. Molotov. His leadership style and, consequently, the results, were not particularly effective. I.V. Kurchatov did not hide his dissatisfaction. With the transition of the

nuclear project into the hands of Beria, the situation changed dramatically ... Beria gave all the work on the project the necessary scope and dynamism ...

"Khariton wrote in the 1990s and this

way:" This man ... possessed ... tremendous energy and efficiency. Our specialists, coming into contact with him, could not fail to note his mind, will and purposefulness. We made sure that he is a first-class organizer who knows how to bring things to the end. It may seem paradoxical, but Beria, who did not hesitate to sometimes show frank rudeness (for the most delicate Yuli Borisovich, any swear word was already “extreme”, which everyone who knew him knows - S.K.), knew how to be polite, tactful and simply a normal person ... The meetings he held were businesslike, always productive, and never dragged on. Beria was quick, did not neglect trips to the Objects and personal acquaintance with the results of the work. According to the impression of many veterans of the nuclear industry, if the country's nuclear project remained under the leadership of Molotov, it would be difficult to count on quick success in carrying out such grandiose-scale work ... ”And this is how academician Andranik Melkonovich assessed Beria

Petrosyants, who knew him in a businesslike way since the war:

“... Being by nature a very smart person, with good technical acumen (in his youth he graduated from a mechanical and construction technical school, was fond of architecture), he became the largest organizer of military equipment in the pre-war and war years. Supervising the military industries on behalf of Stalin during the war years, leading the relevant people's commissariats, he managed to organize the production of many thousands of tanks, self-propelled artillery mounts, many millions of ammunition, shells, ensured the uninterrupted operation of metallurgy in the rear - ferrous and non-ferrous, etc.

Among all the members of the Politburo ... and other top leaders of the country, Beria turned out to be the most prepared in matters

technical policy and technology. I knew all this firsthand, but from personal contacts with him on many technical issues related to tank building and nuclear topics ... He gave all work on the

nuclear problem the necessary scope, breadth of action and dynamism. He possessed great energy and efficiency, was an organizer, able to bring any business he started to the end (I propose to compare this assessment with the independent assessment of Yu.B. Khariton - ***S.K.).*** He often went to sites, got acquainted with the progress and results of work, always provided the necessary assistance and at the same time sharply and severely cracked down on negligent performers, regardless of rank and position (let the reader not think that we are talking about executions, Beria simply filmed negligent , - S.K.). In the process of creating the first Soviet atomic bomb, his role was immeasurable in the full sense of the word ... "

In 1939, Petrosyants was appointed a member of the board and deputy people's commissar of heavy engineering, and since 1940 - the first deputy people's commissar of the machine-tool industry. Since October 1941 - Deputy People's Commissar of the tank industry. Since 1943, Major General of the Tank Engineering Service Petrosyants worked in the State Defense Committee of the USSR - along the same “tank” line. At the end of 1946, Beria took him to the Uranium problem - deputy head of the PGU, and Petrosyants became one of the major figures in the rapidly emerging nuclear technology, a Hero of Socialist Labor.

Andranik Melkonovich Petrosyants (1906-2005) - Soviet scientist and statesman, chairman of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1962-1965), the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy (1978-1986). Hero of Socialist Labor (1962), major general of the tank engineering service (1945)

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Boris Vasilyevich Litvinov, Hero of Socialist Labor, laureate of the Lenin Prize, for many years was the Chief Designer at the nuclear weapons center in

"Chelyabinsk-70" (Snezhinsk). He came to nuclear weapons work as a young specialist in 1952 and had no personal impressions of Beria, although he heard a lot about him from senior comrades. Already in the 1990s, after studying the business style of Beria, Litvinov
wrote:

“It is curious that from the many opinions and numerous technical and economic decisions, Beria chose the main ones and sent them to Stalin. Often multi-page or even multi-volume materials were compressed to one page, or even half of it. Only after that they lay down on the table of the Supreme, who made the final decisions ... ”And before that, Beria carefully read all the multi-page or even

multi-volume materials, with a pencil in his hands! And he did not just hand over the summary to Stalin, but offered solutions. A prominent theoretical physicist from Arzamas-16, Vladislav Nikolayevich Mokhov,

laureate of the Lenin Prize, has been working in Sarov since 1955. A non-standard person, he wrote this about his first years of work in Sarov: “... In our team there was a free atmosphere of work and communication, an extraordinary ...

freedom of discussion and exchange of opinions, which was quite consciously supported by the leadership of VNIIEF ... Apparently, the curator of the work on creating a nuclear weapons L.P. Beria considered this acceptable and necessary to create a creative atmosphere. We could spend hours discussing not only scientific and technical problems, but also philosophical issues related to nuclear weapons, including purely political aspects ... "

As you can see, the Soviet weapons physicist directly points to the personality of Beria as a source of creative atmosphere in the Soviet scientific environment! In other words, it was from Beria that a business-like, but mutually benevolent, atmosphere came in relations between ***efficient*** workers, between people ***of business who*** honestly do this common, one for all, business.

DESERVES attention and the style of Beria's resolutions on documents addressed to him. A typical example... July 19, 1948 Zavenyagin, Minister of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy Lomako, Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission

USSR on the subject of PGU Borisov, academician Alikhanov and deputy Lomako Frolov send to Beria a draft resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the work plan for the “B-9 product” (this is how thorium was coded in the documents). Beria's resolution: ***“1 T. Tevosyan I.T. (Personally). I ask you to consider this project and report your opinion. 2. Tt. Vannikov B.L., Kurchatov I.V. Please provide your views on the proposed program of work on the B-9 for the coming years. L. Beria. July 28, 1948*** "

Among the thousands of visas and resolutions of Beria on the documents of the Atomic Project, there is not ***a single*** “destructive”, humiliating those to whom they are addressed, even if they concerned someone else’s fault. Irina Bystrova, the author of the academic monograph “The Soviet military-industrial complex: problems of formation and development (1930-1980s)”, published in 2006, is by no means benevolent towards Beria. However, she admits that “even in the most acute cases ... Beria’s resolutions remained restrained and constructive”, that “... the contents of Beria’s “Special Folders” show that the style of the“ Beria leadership ”was, although rather tough, but not as much as it is ***presented*** intimidating, ***memories (my*** italics - ***S.K.)”.*** Bystrova evaluates "businesslike" the written orders of Beria as ***In many*** and "cultural".

Here is another example ... In June 1947, the director of the plutonium plant No. 817 under construction, Slavsky, reported outrageous things in a memorandum addressed to Beria: the pace of work is extremely weak, housing construction is a complete failure, workers sit for a long time, out of 41 thousand workers at industrial facilities, only 5,700 people, etc., etc. Beria's resolution to the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR

Kruglov, Vannikov and Zavenyagin: ***“1. We urgently need to strengthen the leadership... Comrade Rapoport released for health reasons. Nominate the building of Tsarevsky as a researcher. 2. Consider the memorandums of comrade Slavsky and comrade Tkachenko and take action on them. Report on the measures taken.*** (Deputy ***3 Chernyshev*** of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Kruglov, ***2-3 months to take all necessary measures on site to ensure the completion of construction and installation work in the installation. Government deadlines. 4. Urgent***

contact comrade Khrulev on the issue of rendering assistance to the building of engineering and technical. works. L. Beria.

More striking examples can be found in the history of the Atomic Project. November 1949… Two months have passed since the successful explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb RDS-1. The production of at least a few new atomic bombs is a matter of vital importance for the USSR, and the minutes of the meeting of Special Committee No. 88a, signed personally by Beria, states that RDS-1 parts from “ametil” (code name for plutonium) at plant No. 817 are stored in damp rooms, which threatened by oxidation. It would seem that comments are unnecessary - the management of the plant can be accused of a state crime! After all, plutonium at that time was the main factor that was more expensive than gold! The "organizing conclusions" were as follows:

“…2. Point out to the head of Combine No. 817 Comrade Muzrukov and the Chief Engineer Comrade Slavsky that such an attitude towards the storage of amethyl products is unacceptable.

3. The deputy head of the plant No. 817 for the regime, comrade Ryzhov, who is responsible for the storage of amethyl and gave the wrong order to lay the details of RDS-1 in a damp room, to announce a reprimand. 4. Oblige the head of plant No. 817, Comrade Muzrukov,

to establish uninterrupted ventilation of the storage facility within 3 days, ensure its thorough drying and equip it with devices to control humidity and temperature.

T. Muzrukov personally systematically check the condition
storage…

5. Instruct ... t. Meshika to check on the spot
enforcement of this decision."

As you can see, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria did not erase anyone into the notorious "camp dust".

BERIA was present at the test on August 29, 1949 at the Semipalatinsk test site, then known in a narrow circle as "Training Ground No. 2" ... He visited the assembly building at the 37-meter steel truss tower, on which the "product" was supposed to be raised, then went to the command post of Experience.

The tower on which the charge of the first domestic atomic bomb RDS-1 was placed. Nearby is the assembly building. Landfill near Semipalatinsk, 1949



Control panel for the detonation of the first atomic bomb

Atomic charge of the first domestic atomic bomb RDS-1
in the Museum of Nuclear Weapons

The weather was let down - you could expect anything, up to a thunderstorm. As if the situation was repeated during the first American explosion in Alamogordo - there, too, the weather did not work out, and the Americans were forced to postpone the explosion. It turned out the opposite for us - Kurchatov, fearing surprises from wind and rain, decided to postpone the explosion from 8.00 to 7.00. The leaders of the experiment, headed by Beria, were at the

command post. At 06.33 on August 29, 1949, the sealed door to the control room was opened, and the power supply of the automation system was turned on.

1300 instruments and 9700 indicators were in readiness to register all the phenomena of the explosion. The experiment manager, Malsky, monotonously announced the time remaining before the explosion on the broadcast warning system. At 6.48, the field machine was turned on - a stage-by-stage machine activation of devices for undermining atomic charge capsules.

At 6.50, the field machine turned on the glow of all the lamps in the devices arranged along the radii of the Experimental Field. And not only the filaments of the radio tubes glowed, but the glow grew inside those who were now at the command post.

In the "perestroika" times, I.N. Golovin, an employee of the Kurchatov Laboratory No. 2, made the public happy with the story that when the field machine was launched, Beria allegedly said to Kurchatov something like: "But nothing will come of you." But Yu.B. Khariton, directly refuting Golovin, wrote about this gossip: “... this did not happen. Golovin was not at these works, and all sorts of rumors spread ... "

20 seconds before the explosion, the operator, at the command of the head of the explosion, turned on the main switch connecting the "product" with the automation system, and at exactly 7.00 the whole area was lit up with blinding light. Approximately 30 seconds later, a shock wave approached the command post. It became clear that the experiment was a success. Everyone rushed to each other, hugged, congratulated each other, shouted: “We have it!”, “We managed to make it!” Beria also hugged - everyone remembers how he impulsively hugged Kurchatov. He also embraced Khariton, kissing him on the forehead. And he kept escaping, trying to close the door before the arrival of the shock waves.

Everyone was happy, but only Lavrenty Pavlovich understood what an important event in the history of Russia had just happened, of all those who were at the CP. Of all those gathered here, he was the only one who had ***all*** the information about the plans for US nuclear aggression against Russia.

In 1945, a book by G.D. Smith, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. Official report on the development of the atomic bomb under the supervision of the US government. Beria, on the other hand, came up with the idea of writing a Russian analogue of the Smith report, and under his editorship, the secretariat of the Special Committee prepared in 1952-1953 for

open publication collection "History of mastering atomic energy in the USSR". It was also conceived as a report of the USSR government to the peoples of the USSR. In the book of the 5th volume II of the multi-volume series “Atomic Project of the USSR. Documents and Materials”, published by the Ministry of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation - the Federal Agency for Atomic Energy, a draft version of this collection is given. The role of Beria personally was said there in a few words, but the picture of what the country had accomplished was given very

complete, and therefore majestic. Beria believed that the time had come when people should learn that they were malnourished, wore quilted jackets, lived closely after the war, not least because the funds went to ensure the peaceful future of Russia. The Soviet people also had to learn what a majestic feat and in what short time they accomplished, creating not only an atomic bomb, but also a powerful new branch of the economy - the atomic industry. After the murder of Beria, the idea of \u200b\u200breporting to the people was abandoned.

But in

vain! In the section of the collection “The success of Soviet science is not accidental”, which spoke about the work of Russian and Soviet scientists, there were also the following

lines: “In 1922, Vernadsky predicted:“ The time is not far off when a person will receive atomic energy in his hands ... this power, direct it to good, and not to self-destruction? Has he matured to the ability to use the power that science must inevitably give him? Scientists must not turn a blind eye to the possible consequences of their scientific work... They must feel responsible for the consequences of their discoveries. They must associate their work with the best organization of everything

mankind"..."

government that Beria included in the official illustrative, collection of these thoughts of Vernadsky. Unlike the leaders of the West, the leaders of the USSR were imbued with their ***natural*** desire for peace, their ***natural*** sense of responsibility for the peaceful and free future of the world. It was not without reason that the slogan “Peace to the world!” was born in Stalin’s USSR.

The draft of the collection "History of mastering atomic energy in the USSR" included the following words: "The atomic bomb is in the hands of the Soviet people

is the guarantee of peace. Indian Prime Minister Nehru correctly assessed the significance of the Soviet atomic bomb when he declared: "The significance of the atomic discovery can contribute to the prevention of war" ... "

This is how Stalin, Beria and the entire Soviet leadership looked at the problem of the "Bomb". In the United States, the atomic bomb was officially regarded as a means of diktat, as a weapon for a nuclear strike on the USSR. Stalin and Beria viewed Soviet nuclear weapons as a factor in stabilizing and deterring potential aggression. And this is a historical fact! The scoundrels are trying to present Stalin and Beria as moral monsters, soulless manipulators of the destinies of hundreds of millions of people. And Stalin, Beria and their associates lived and worked for peace and creation. Destruction, death, war were organically alien to them, in contrast to the present West and the United States, which can no longer live without killing, destroying, suppressing the will and freedom of peoples.

The reaction of the West to the Soviet test of the atomic bomb varied. The Labor MP Blackburn, known for his sharp attacks on the Soviet Union, had the objectivity of September 28, 1949 in an interview with the Daily Express newspaper to ridicule the suggestion that the Soviet Union owes its intelligence bomb to information. He admitted: ***“First of all, the issue of producing a significant amount of atomic energy does not depend on secrets, this requires the organized efforts of scientists, technicians and engineers, and this discovery was more of an industrial than scientific miracle” ... Political columnist for the weekly Italian magazine*** Tempo ” Roberto

Candelupo ironically remarked: “... with ***regard to the atomic bomb in the USSR, the American*** year 1952 (the date expected in the United States for the implementation of the Soviet Atomic Project, - ***S.K.) came in 1949 ... Russia gave amazing proof of its will, its ability to work and the ability to keep a secret ... Their scientific efforts were colossal, their organizational work was colossal, Stalin's titanic will won.***

The Italian wrote correctly - both about the titanic will of Russia and Stalin, and about the ability of Russians to keep a secret. But hardly even

Western intelligence services knew that the words "colossal organizational work" should have been attributed, first of all, to Lavrenty Beria, who "exchanged" fifty years of the RDS-1 test in the year.

America then for the first time experienced a shock similar to those that it subsequently experienced only three more times: in the fall of 1957 after the announcement of the launch of the First artificial Earth satellite in the USSR, in the spring of 1961 after the launch of Gagarin, and in the fall of 1962 during the Caribbean missile crisis. And in 1949, a member of the US House of Representatives, Rankin, proposed moving the US capital from Washington to the small town of Paducah in Kentucky. Senator Wylie sent a letter to US Secretary of Defense Jackson insisting on the transfer of the US Department of Defense offices from the Pentagon building and dispersing them around the country. These, of course, were manifestations of political paranoia, but it does not prevent us from remembering them - as soon as America begins to feel its vulnerability, it loses all restraint

and immediately turns its tail. All four "universal" shocks of America were directly related to the activities of Lavrenty Beria, not only in the Soviet Atomic Project, but also in the Soviet Rocket Project. And the organization of successful post-war rocket work in the USSR was another major victory for Beria.

Tenth victory
1946–1953. Preparing Gagarin's Launch: Solving the Missile Problem

On July 1, 1953, already after his arrest, Beria wrote to Malenkov in his first “letter from the

bunker”: “... I should especially note our joint active long-term work in the Special Committee under the Council of Ministers on the creation of atomic weapons, and later on the Comet system and“ Berkut" - guided missiles. <…>

According to the Berkut, the tests were completed successfully. Now the whole point is to ensure the production in series and the corresponding personnel, and a lot is being done in this area ... The main thing on the basis of the "Kometa" and "Berkut" there are enormous opportunities for further improvements in the field of guided projectiles, both in terms of accuracy, and in terms of speed and range ... This weapon must be moved forward, this is the real future, with which the

army of our Country must be armed .... " Malenkov was part of the official leadership of atomic and rocket work, but not only atomic scientists, but also rocket scientists knew only Beria in a businesslike way. Beria supervised missile

work in three directions: ÿ development

of the Kometa cruise missile; ÿ development of the air defense system "Berkut" for

the defense of Moscow from air raids; ÿ development of long-range ballistic miss



KS-1 (abbreviated from "Kometa-projectile", product "B", GRAU index - 4K87, according to the classification of the US Defense Ministry and NATO - AS-1 "Kennel") - the first Soviet aviation anti-ship cruise missile. In 1953, the Comet was officially put into service, although it was put into production a year earlier. In the first half of the 1960s, the replacement of the KS-1 in operation with more advanced types of missiles KSR-2 and KSR-11 began with the corresponding refinement of the Tu-16KS missile carriers to the Tu-16K-11-16 and Tu-16K-16 modifications (Tu-16KSR, u-16KSR-2). The last KS-1 was decommissioned in 1969.

Pavel Nikolayevich Kuksenko (1896-1980) - engineer and scientist, developer of air defense systems. Major General of the Engineering Service. Winner of two Stalin Prizes

For the development of Soviet work on "long-range" missiles, which were later called intercontinental ballistic missiles - ICBMs, Lavrenty Pavlovich did an exceptionally lot. Peaceful modifications of these ICBMs launched Yuri Gagarin, German Titov and their comrades in the first cosmonaut squad into space. But there were, as said, other directions ...

DECISION of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3140-1028ss on the development of an unmanned aerial-missile system "Kometa" with nuclear combat equipment was adopted in September 1947 - even before this equipment was created. However, it was also planned to equip the conventional warhead.

Development - along with the Berkut system, was carried out by a special design bureau KB-1 under the leadership of Pavel Nikolaevich Kuksenko, a Soviet scientist and designer in the field of radio engineering, and Sergo Lavrentievich Beria, Beria's son. The Tu-4 piston bomber was used as the first carrier, and later the Tu-16 jet bomber.

In May 1952, Beria, together with his son Sergo, led the State tests of the Comet on the Black Sea on the basis of the "atomic" 71st Air Force training ground in the Kerch region (the village of Bagerovo). A cruise missile, similar to a swept-wing aircraft, pierced the side of the decommissioned cruiser Krasny Kavkaz and exited from the other side. Success was preceded by long and dangerous work, and the main flight test of the unmanned complex was carried out by Sultan Amet-Khan, a Crimean Tatar, controlling a rocket from a tiny experimental cabin. The Sultan became a true friend of Sergo Beria. And the fact that the Crimean Tatar was able to make friends with the son of the one who led the eviction of the Sultan's tribesmen from the Crimea in 1944 proves that they, precisely as a people, were very guilty of the Soviet Motherland. Two

other testers of the Comet were Sergey Anokhin and Vasily Pavlov. For their courage and heroism, both were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on February 3, 1953. Amet Khan during the war became twice Hero of the Soviet Union, and the appearance in peacetime of the third - after Kozhedub and Pokryshkin - pilot, three times Hero of the Soviet Union, would have caused unnecessary talk. Therefore, Amet-Khan did not receive the third Golden Star for his heroic flights. In 1953, he - a Crimean, I remind you, a Tatar - among other developers of the complex was awarded the Stalin Prize. However, the Comet was a means

of attack, and defensive systems turned out to be vital for the USSR. It should have been like this

become the Berkut system, designed to prevent a breakthrough to Moscow even by one American bomber carrying nuclear weapons.

DECISION of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3389-1426ss / op (“special folder”) on the start of work on the Berkut air defense system of Moscow was adopted on August 9, 1950. The system was so classified that the military department was not aware of this project. "Berkut" became the ancestor of all subsequent air defense systems of the USSR, and the "god" "father" was Lavrenty Beria.

In order to better understand the tension of work on the Berkut, I will inform you that, according to S.A. Lavochkin, the creator of the famous La-5 and La-7 fighters and then a number of jet fighters, it was as difficult to work on the Berkut as it was not difficult even during the war years. The unprecedented haste was due to the fact that Stalin and Beria had reliable information about the real threat of an atomic war between the West and the USSR. It would begin, of course, with the atomic bombing of

Moscow. To "ensure the development, design and manufacture of the means included in the Berkut air defense complex" on February 3, 1951, the Third Main Directorate (TSU) under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was formed by decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 307-144ss / op. The Third Main Directorate was headed by Vasily Ryabikov, a longtime acquaintance of Beria since the war, a former deputy commissar, and later the first deputy minister of armaments. TSU was directly subordinate to Beria's Special Committee. Pavel Kuksenko and Sergo Beria had the status of Chief Designers, Beria chose the Hero of Socialist Labor Amo Elyan as the

head of the design bureau. During the war, General Yelyan directed the main artillery plant for the production of the most massive field and tank guns of medium caliber (100,000 guns were fired by Victory Day). Then Yelyan entered the sphere of interests of Beria. As in the "atomic" business, Beria saw the key to the success of "rocket" cases in competent personnel and therefore transferred Yelyan, who had previously worked in the PSU system, to the TSU system. After the arrest of Beria, General Yelyan did not renounce him, although Yelyan's fate changed dramatically and badly after that.

Ryabikov was an experienced manager, but in acute situations, Beria also connected to Ryabikov the head of the "atomic" PGU Vannikov. Vannikov, according to Grigory Kisunko, one of the developers of the Berkut system, sometimes spoke very harshly: “I ... am going to report to the LP that all of you here have forgotten what responsibility is ... You have been spoiled and think that everything is allowed to you. They gave you everything you asked for ... And now that's enough, now let's "... However, as even the hater admits, it is not clear why, both Beria - both father and son, Kisunko, managed "without searching ... scapegoats."

As for the eye-catching abbreviation “LP” (from “Lavrenty Pavlovich”), few gunsmiths received such an honor, and only those who were respected informally: “YuB” - Yuliy Borisovich Khariton, “ADS” - Andrey Dmitrievich Sakharov, “ SP "- Sergey Pavlovich Korolev. Kurchatov, by the way, was called "Beard".

FROM THE SECOND half of the 1940s and then in the early 1950s Lavrenty Pavlovich supervised at the same time:

- "atomic" First Main Directorate, headed by B.L. Vannikov;
- "atomic" Second Main Directorate, headed by P.Ya. Antropov, who was in charge of the extraction and processing of uranium raw materials into concentrate, and also carried out production and technical management of the extraction of uranium from deposits developed in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, and control of geological exploration for uranium and thorium; -
- “rocket” Third Main Directorate for Guided Missiles and Air Defense Systems, headed by V.N. Ryabikov. And this

was not all that Lavrenty Beria oversaw in the arms industry - there were also separate long-range missiles, but about them - later. In 1951, the Berkut project began the stage of manufacturing prototypes. In November 1952, the first launch of the V-300 anti-aircraft guided missile took place at an air target. On April 26, 1953, a remote-controlled Tu-4 bomber was shot down, which was used as a target aircraft. And in May 1953, the first stage of the radio-controlled launch program was completed.

aircraft. Here are two later assessments of the contribution of Beria Sr. to these achievements.

General M.I. Naumenko:

“He repeatedly visited the Kapustin Yar training ground (in the Astrakhan region, - ***S.K.),*** where, by the way, his son Sergey participated in the tests ... During the construction period, until 1953, while Beria was responsible for the implementation of the project, neither there was not one failure

from the very beginning"

Lieutenant General, Academician A.G. Basistov (an outstanding figure in Soviet work on air defense and missile defense): “In August 1952, I reported to Lavrentiy Beria

on the state of the polygon sample of the Moscow air defense system. Beria came to our facility ... He spoke calmly, respectfully ... On that visit, he solved the problem of food for us. We worked for 18 hours, and there was really nowhere to eat. And after his visit, everything immediately appeared.” I don't think that special comments are required here. On this we part with

the Berkut project. Further, we will talk about Beria - the

"distant rocket man."

SERIOUSLY, guided ballistic missiles in the USSR were taken up after the end of the war, when they managed to fully find out how far they had come off everyone here - not only from the USSR, but also from the USA, the Germans with their fantastic V-2 rocket at that time ("V-2 "). Ballistic missiles are called because after the end of the work of an extremely "gluttonous" rocket engine, the rocket flies along a ballistic trajectory - like a stone thrown by a boy's hand into the expanse of heaven. In the spring of 1945, Soviet specialists examined the German rocket research

center in Peenemünde, located on an area of about 80 square meters. kilometers, with more than 150 buildings. The number of employees at the institute reached 7,500 people ... Work began on dismantling equipment and exporting it to the USSR from Peenemünde, from the Rheinmetall Borsig rocket plant in the Marienfelde suburb of Berlin, etc. In Germany itself, the Nordenhausen Institute worked at one time. Head of the Institute

was the Major General of the Artillery L. Gaidukov, and the chief engineer was S. Korolev, the same one ...

Soviet specialists, and the Germans.

On April 17, 1946, Stalin was sent a note on the organization of research and experimental work in the field of missile weapons in the USSR. The note was signed by L. Beria, G. Malenkov, N. Bulganin, D. Ustinov and the head of the Main Artillery Directorate of the Red Army N. Yakovlev. This, without exaggeration, historical note said that in Germany 25 research organizations were engaged in rocket weapons issues, and up to 15 samples of rocket projectiles were developed, including the V-2 long-range missile with a maximum range of 400 kilometers. The note ended with the words: "It would be expedient to convene a special meeting with you to discuss all these issues."

Anatoly Georgievich Basistov (1920-1998) - Soviet scientist and designer in the field of radio engineering and electronics, general designer of the Research Institute of Radio Instrumentation (1985-1998)

V-300 missile and B-200 radar



Aerial view of the German rocket research center at Peenemünde on the island of Usedom

Peenemünde Proving Ground Museum. Cruise missile V-1. Behind her is an inclined accelerating catapult, designed to give the initial flight speed. Farther away you can see a train running along the railroad serving the landfill.

On April 29, 1946, such a meeting took place with Stalin, it went from 21.00 to 22.45, after which only Bulganin and Malenkov remained with Stalin. Soon, a Special Committee on Jet Technology was formed under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, headed at first by G.M. Malenkov, and then, already as Committee No. 2, - N.A. Bulganin. Beria had enough to do without long-range missiles, he had a lot of trouble with atomic work. However, it ended with the fact that the work on long-range missiles could not be done without Lavrenty Beria, but not immediately.

MAY 10, 1947 in the Special Committee of Jet Technology under the Council of Ministers of the USSR - in accordance with the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1454-388 "Issues of jet technology" - there was a "changing of the guard". The first paragraph of the Decree renamed the Special Committee of Reactive Technology Committee No. 2, but the essence was in the second paragraph (there were five in total), which read: “ ***To appoint the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Bulganin N.A. Chairman of Committee No. 2 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, having granted the request of Comrade Malenkov G.M. release him from this duty.*** The replacement of Malenkov by Bulganin had nothing to do with the so-called "aviation case" - the Politburo's resolution on this "case" was adopted on May 4, 1946, and Malenkov ceased to be chairman of the Special Committee on Jet Technology only a year later.

Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov was the chief "rocketeer" - Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin became the chief "rocketeer". And long-range missiles still did not fly, or flew poorly. Why? Neither

Malenkov

nor Bulganin were mediocre managers - there were no incompetent and mediocrity in Stalin's classic "team", even Khrushchev under Stalin did not particularly stand out from the general team. Both Malenkov and Bulganin worked hard and sensibly before the war, during the war, and after the war. But with the missile Special Committee, neither one nor the other did not work out. Why?

Is it because Malenkov, Bulganin by the turn of the 1940s-1950s had neither the taste for the new that Beria had, nor the taste for people that Beria had? Post-war defense problems were distinguished by unprecedented novelty: atomic weapons, jet aircraft, rocketry of various classes led by long-range missiles, multifunctional radar, new electronics, digital electronic computers, new, often exotic, previously unproduced materials ...

Even experienced Stalinist comrades-in-arms were lost here, but Beria was not!

Why?

Well, firstly, because Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was more talented - he had a quick and accurate reaction, immediately grasped the essence, thought broadly. Secondly, he was extremely hardworking, hardworking, and used his free time from assigned work for work. Finally, Beria knew how not only to pick up people who, together with him, did what was entrusted by the Motherland and Stalin, but also knew how not to waste time on trifles, trusting them.

The famous rocket scientist Boris Chertok is by no means disposed towards Beria. However, comparing the situation with the rocket men, over whom stood the apparatus of the Defense Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by Ivan Serbin, who had the nickname "Ivan the Terrible", and among the "atomic scientists", he recalled that without Serbin's sanction, no changes, encouragement were possible. etc. But in the Atomic project and in the Berkut project, everything was, according to Chertok, fundamentally different, and he even reports with some sadness that where Beria was in charge, all personnel decisions were made by Vannikov, agreeing them with Kurchatov and only presenting Beria for approval.

Of course, Chertok went overboard here - Beria made key personnel decisions himself, starting with the involvement of the same Vannikov in nuclear work and ending with the appointment of directors of enterprises, as was the case with the director of the “plutonium” plant No. 817 Muzrukov, whom Beria “married” from Uralmash . But Beria trusted his subordinates - those who deserved it. The apparatus of the “atomic” Special Committee No. 1 was small, although the Secretariat had many responsibilities, including the preparation of draft Resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers, including those on appointments. And this team

Beria's closest aides worked effectively. In addition, another feature of Beria's style was extremely fruitful. It is not so common among managers, but is appreciated by subordinates. It is about readiness for collective thinking, about the ability to involve in the development of decisions all those who could usefully express themselves on the merits of the issue. As you know, the mind is good, but two is better. But, studying the leadership style

of Beria, you are convinced that he accepted this truth in an improved version: “Mind is good, but ***twenty*** is better.” At the same time, Beria did not “smear” his personal responsibility for the decision on many. The final decision - if it was a decision requiring the level of Beria - was taken by Beria, not hiding behind the backs of his subordinates. And before Stalin, he always

answered himself.

Actually, Stalin also led the same way, with the only difference that Comrade Stalin was no longer responsible for his decisions to someone personally, but to the people and history.

The years went

by... By the beginning of 1949, in the Uranium problem - with Beria - there was a close success, and with the creation of rocket technology - with Bulganin - things were going much worse. On January 8, 1949, Lev Gonor, head of the head missile NII-88, and the party organizer of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks at NII-88, Ivan Utkin, turned directly to Stalin with a particularly important memorandum, where they reported that work on the creation of rocket weapons was being carried out slowly, and that the Decree government dated April 14, 1948 No. 1175-440ss is in danger of failure. ***“It seems to us ,”*** wrote Gonor and Utkin, “ ***that this is due to an underestimation of the importance of work on rocket weapons by a number of ministries.”*** Gonor and Utkin ended their note with a request to Stalin: ***"In order to radically improve matters in the manufacture of rockets, we ask for your personal intervention."***

Things, however, were still going neither shaky nor rolly, and by the end of August 1949 Committee No. 2 under the Council of Ministers of the USSR was liquidated. Responsibility for the development of long-range missiles by the especially important Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 3656-1520 of August 28, 1949

assigned to the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. By order of the Minister Marshal Vasilevsky No. 00140 dated August 30, 1949, the formation of the Directorate for Jet Weapons of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs was initiated. Alas, nothing good came of it. Already in the first order of Vasilevsky there were many words, but few practical thoughts and concrete ideas. So, there were no particular successes in the Department for Jet Weapons of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

And then the Berkut project arrived, for the implementation of which on February 3, 1951, the Third Main Directorate was formed by Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 307-144ss / op, closing on L.P. Beria. The result was expected - on August 4, 1951, Stalin signed the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 2837-1349 with the stamp “Top Secret. Of particular importance," which began:

“The Council of Ministers of the USSR DECIDES: 1.

In view of the fact that the development of long-range missiles R-1, R-2, R-3 and the organization of mass production of the R-1 rocket are related to work on the Berkut and Kometa, to impose supervision for the work of ministries and departments to create these missiles on the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Comrade Beria L.P. "

And immediately the situation with long-range missiles began to improve. On December 10, 1951, the R-1 long-range missile was put into service with a flight range of 270 kilometers with a warhead containing 750 kg of explosive with a range dispersion of ± 8 km, side dispersion ± 4 km. This was only the beginning - not very successful so far, but back in the summer of 1951, Beria's predecessors could not establish mass production of the P-1 at the Dnepropetrovsk "automobile" plant (the famous "Yuzhmash"). Engineers began to be trained for the

emerging rocket industry, the life of rocket scientists began to improve - all according to the "atomic" scheme worked out long ago by Beria and his associates.

Let's go back to the spring days of 1946, when on April 14 and 29 two meetings on the "missile" topic were held in Stalin's Kremlin office, and on May 13, 1946, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. on jet technology, chaired by G.M. Malenkov. Beria to the "rocket" Malenkov Special Committee as a member

was not included, but here is the assessment of P.I. Kachur, author of the article "Missile technology of the USSR: the post-war period until 1948" in No. 6 of the journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences "Energy" for 2007. Stalin, Beria - like the Soviet system in general, they are not very fond of in the post-Soviet Academy of Sciences, but the fact that the

academic journal recognized is all the more precious: “In fact, rocket science was led by L.P. Beria. G.M. Malenkov was not involved in organizational and production issues and was the formal chairman of the committee.

B.E. Chertok also confirms that Malenkov, like Bulganin, who replaced him, "did not play a special role in the development of ... industries." “Their high role,” Chertok admitted, “was reduced to reviewing or signing draft resolutions prepared by the committee apparatus.” Everything was repeated, as in the case of the “aviator” Malenkov and the “tanker” Molotov during the war. They presided, and Beria pulled the cart, although this was not always formalized.

Moreover, the role of Beria in the development of Soviet rocket science and technology was all the more significant because the rocket scientists, in addition to Beria, had only one influential supporter in the country's top leadership - Stalin himself. Aviation designers, with the exception of Lavochkin, treated rocket technology with restraint, to put it mildly. As, however, at first, and to jet aircraft. According to the testimony of the same B.E. Chertok, aircraft designer Alexander Yakovlev “was unfriendly to ... the work of A.M. Lyulki on the first domestic version of a turbojet engine, ”and even published a sensational article in Pravda, where he characterized German work in the field of jet aviation as the ***agony*** of Nazi engineering.

The generals did not favor a new type of weapon (which, however, had yet to become a weapon). In 1948, at a meeting with Stalin, another Yakovlev, Marshal of Artillery, spoke out sharply against the adoption of rocket technology into service. He emphasized the complexity and low reliability of missiles, as well as the fact that the same tasks are solved by aviation. The "father of cosmonautics" Sergei Korolev just as sharply spoke out "for", but in 1948 Marshal Yakovlev and Colonel Korolev were figures of very different calibers.

But Beria immediately supported the missiles. Actually, the fact that the People's Commissar for Armaments Ustinov (who to some extent can be considered "Beria's man"), and not

People's Commissar of the aviation industry Shakhurin (who can be considered to some extent "Malenkov's man"), immediately reveals the influence of Beria. Beria established working contacts with Ustinov during the war, and Ustinov's appointment as a "rocketeer" could hardly have happened apart from Lavrenty Pavlovich. But in vain we will look for the name of Beria in the pages of the popular history of Soviet rocket work. Well, it's good that at least our "atomic" history did not disdain to pay tribute to the "LP".

AFTER Beria became the official Curator, in addition to the Atomic Problem and the Missile Problem, our rocket science began to firmly get on its feet, and the development of work on long-range missiles proceeded at an ever-increasing pace. On February 13, 1953, the "Beria" Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 442-212ss / op "On the plan for development work on long-range missiles for 1953-1955" was adopted. with an extensive program. By October 1953, the R-5 rocket with an effective flight range of 1200 km with a maximum deviation from the target at the greatest effective range was to be presented for test tests: ± 6 km in range, ± 5 km in side. This was already a success, and by August 1955, R-12 missiles with a range of 1500 km should have been ready with the same maximum deviations from the target as for the R-5. Moreover, the Decree of February 13, 1953 oriented rocket scientists to a high-boiling oxidizer - nitric acid with nitrogen oxides, and this sharply reduced the time for preparing the rocket for launch.

"Rocketeer" Beria - if he had stayed with the leadership - could have done even more, and not only for long-range military missiles. Since 1949, when the program of launches of the first Soviet B-2A type geophysical rockets began, the first launches of dogs into the upper atmosphere were carried out in the USSR. This was done, in particular, by Professor V.I. Chernov and Doctor of Medical Sciences V.I. Yakovlev. And Sergei Pavlovich Korolev already in the winter of 1948 issued the first task for designing a cockpit for a pilot placed on a high-altitude rocket. Korolev knew how to dream in a businesslike way, knew how to look far ahead. But Lavrenty Beria also knew how to dream. In the early 1950s, his efforts worked for Gagarin's future takeoff into near-Earth space.

a space that became a reality less than eight years after the death of Beria in the Khrushchev dungeons. In 1953,

Khrushchev, who eliminated Stalin, conceived a new conspiracy - against Beria. And Beria, not as a beautiful-hearted dreamer, but as a socialist technocrat, thought about what needs to be done so that the Soviet man would be the first to enter the expanses of the universe. The year 1953 turned out

to be black for Russia - Stalin was killed in March, and a few months later - Beria. But Beria managed to do something even after Stalin's death. On March 16, 1953, on the initiative of Beria, Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 697-355ss / op “On the management of special work” was adopted. All work: "atomic", on "Berkut" and "Comet", on long-range missiles, were assigned to a single Special Committee chaired by Beria under First Deputy Vannikov. "Atomist" and "rocketeer" Beria worked for peace for

Soviet Russia, and the best manager of socialism Beria worked to ensure that Soviet Russia quickly overcome the consequences of the war and reached the most advanced positions in all spheres of society. And success in this matter was another victory for Beria for the glory of Russia.

Eleventh victory 1945–
1953. We have no barriers: new
the power of the economy

STARTING from the time of work as the first secretary of the Transcaucasian regional committee of the CPSU (b) and the first secretary of the Central Committee of the CP (b) of Georgia, Beria had to master the craft of a “multi-machine” manager and solve the most diverse problems not sequentially, but in parallel, that is, simultaneously ! After being transferred to Moscow in 1938, the need for a parallel solution of various, often very far from each other, problems for Beria only increased, and accompanied him until the last day of his state activity before the war, during the war and after the war. There is a curious document - “Extract from the Protocol No. 81 of the meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks on the distribution of L.P. Beria. Here is part of his text: “March 15, 1951 ***Strictly secret*** Decision of March 15, 1951. 1. Questions of the Council of Ministers
of the USSR.

<…>

4. Tov. Beria to oblige half of his working time to devote to the case No. 1, 2 and 3. Secretary of the
Central Committee.

It was deciphered as follows ... "Secretary of the Central Committee" - Stalin. "Tov. Beria, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and Deputy
Chairman
of the Council of Ministers of the USSR. And further: "Case No. 1" - the duties of "Comrade. Beria" on the "atomic" Special Committee and the First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which led the rapidly developing nuclear industry - research institutes, design bureaus, plants, factories, construction organizations;

"case number 2" - the duties of "comrade. Beria" under the Second Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR headed by P.Ya. Antropov, who in 1949 separated from PGU and was responsible for geological exploration, mining, processing and metallurgy of uranium;

"case number 3" - the duties of "comrade. Beria" according to the Third Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR headed by V.M. Ryabikov, which was formed in February 1951 and was responsible for work on the Moscow Berkut air defense

system. The reader is aware of "cases No. 1, 2 and 3". But, as follows from the Politburo Resolution, these cases were officially supposed to occupy only ***half of*** Beria's working time. An objective workload for supervising only one "case number ..." - any of the three, would be enough for the entire, moreover, an irregular working day. And there were three cases. And all three dealt with issues of strategic defense. And Stalin obliged Beria to devote only half of his working time to these matters. To what did Comrade owe Lavrenty Beria constantly give ***the second half*** of his strength,

energy and working day (the words "working day" are hardly appropriate here)? From August 4, 1951, for "Comrade Beria L.P." Stalin will also consolidate yet another defense matter - so to

speak, "Case No. 4", that is, monitoring the work of ministries and departments engaged in work on long-range missiles. However, for the time being March 1951 was on the calendar, and Beria had to give half of his working time to something else ... What? We find the answer in the documents, and this answer can be briefly formulated as follows: the restoration and development of the national economy of the USSR.

That

is, Beria's "flight" into history took place - as it should be for the normal flight of a great statesman - on two wings. One "wing" - military, defensive. The other "wing" is peaceful. DURING the war years, the USSR lost about 30% of the national wealth. About 32,000 industrial enterprises were completely destroyed or plundered, and

among them were Dneproges, Zaporizhstal,

Kryvorizhstal, Azovstal, Kharkiv

and

Stalingrad Tractor Plants, Ukrainian "Uralmash" - Novo Kramatorsk Heavy Machine Building Plant, Novorossiysk Cement Plant, Odessa and Novorossiysk ports ...

Dneproges blown up in 1943 by the retreating Germans

Sevastopol in 1945.

Plant "Red October". Stalingrad

Residents of Kyiv are restoring the city after its liberation from Nazi German invaders

98,000 collective farms, 1,876 state farms, 2,890 machine and tractor stations (MTS), 216,700 shops, canteens, restaurants, 4,100 railway stations, 36,000 communications enterprises, 6,000 hospitals, 33,000 clinics, dispensaries were completely or partially destroyed or looted. and an outpatient clinic, 976 sanatoriums, 656 rest homes, 82,000 schools, 1,520 technical schools, 334 universities, 427 museums, 43,000 libraries, 167 theaters. Only the direct damage inflicted on the economy and the population amounted to 679 billion rubles in 1941 prices, while the annual national income in 1938 was 105 billion rubles. Plus - the cost of the war and the loss of income as a result of the occupation - another 1890 billion rubles.

Neither the mind nor the heart can grasp all this today, is not aware of it! Four years ago, there lived a happy, rapidly developing country that overcame severe storms and crises, and now there are piles of burnt bricks and twisted iron.

And all this had to be restored. How? How?
To

whom?

In 1945, only for building materials, the percentage of production by 1940 was for cement - 29.6%; for window glass - 45.1%, for brick - 18.6%, for lime - 33.1%. About the industry of building machines and equipment, we had to talk in general in the past - for now - time.

Such a "martyrology" of the pre-war Soviet economy can go on and on. Even those of its branches that during the war directly worked for defense, although they developed, but without the war, their successes and production base would have been even more powerful and impressive. What can we say about the purely "peaceful" industries, designed to ensure the prosperity of the people, their health, leisure, and so on, without which a normal life is impossible. The war had a detrimental effect both on the industry of group "A", which produces the means of production, and on the industry of group "B", which produces consumer goods. Now what was destroyed had to be restored, what had survived had to be renovated, what had been conceived before the war, but not realized, had to be built,

translating plans into stone and metal.

IMMEDIATELY after the end of the war with Japan - on September 6, 1945, the Politburo adopted a Resolution on the formation of two Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars (SNK) of the USSR. During the war - on December 8, 1942, the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee was formed, consisting of: Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan. This Bureau supervised the activities of the people's commissariats that were key to the economy. The Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, formed at the same time, consisting of: Molotov, Mikoyan, Andreev, Voznesensky, Shvernik, although had the most important, but less ambitious tasks. Now, instead of the Operational Bureau of the GKO and the Bureau of the Council of People's Commissars, the overall management of the economy was entrusted to two Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars, but the essence and distribution of responsibilities remained approximately the same - one

Bureau was key, the second - less, so to speak, key. In the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR of September 6, 1945, the Operations Bureau headed by Molotov was the first to go. Voznesensky - deputy, members: Mikoyan, Andreev

Molotov was in charge of the work of agricultural and food people's commissariats, people's commissariats of trade and finance, as well as committees and departments under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. The Molotov Bureau was in charge of the People's Commissariats of Justice, Health, the Sea and River Fleet, the Main Directorates of the Civil Air Fleet and Labor Reserves, the Northern Sea Route, the Committees for Physical Education, Architecture, Cinematography, etc. The People's Commissariat of Defense and the People's Commissariat of Defense also wrote down for the Molotov Bureau Navy, but it was clear that they were listed behind Molotov "for solidity" - these two people's commissariats were personally controlled by Stalin.

The second Operational Bureau was headed by Beria. Malenkov - deputy, members: Voznesensky, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and Kosygin. This Bureau was in charge of "issues of the work of industrial people's commissariats and railway transport." The following people's commissariats were registered for the Beria Bureau: ferrous metallurgy; non-ferrous metallurgy; heavy industry; coal industry; oil industry; chemical industry; rubber industry; power plants; electrical industry; medium engineering; machine tool industry; means of communication; aviation industry; tank industry; ammunition; mortar shipbuilding weapons; weapons; forest paper industry; industry; textile light industry; industry; industry; construction; building materials. In addition, the Main Directorates of Military Development; fuel Glavlesohran and the Committee for Geology; Glavoxygen; Glavsnables;

industry; coal and oil supply

In other words, **all the leading sectors of the economy were recorded behind the Operational Bureau of Beria. Their restoration and development made it possible to restore the country and ensure the ever-increasing well-being of the people.** Moreover, it was Beria who, since the war, was better than anyone from the Politburo (except, of course, Stalin), was familiar with most of the people's commissariats from the "gentleman's set" offered to him by Stalin. And since August 1945, Beria also had an “atomic” Special Committee, which then included Academician Kapitsa, who recommended Beria when organizing “atomic”

work to use foreign experience in laying a transatlantic cable. Do-ah-ah...

On March 18, 1946, Beria became a full member of the Politburo. The Plenum of the Central Committee introduced him, a candidate member of the PB, to the top party leadership at the same time as Malenkov. And on March 19, 1946, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR was transformed into the Council of Ministers, where Stalin took the posts of Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of the Armed

Forces of the USSR. Now Stalin had eight deputies, no longer for the Council of People's Commissars, but for the Council of Ministers. The first on their list was, as always, Molotov, but the second - not alphabetically - Beria. However, already the next day - March 20, 1946, it became clear which of the first two deputies was more of a “wedding” general and who was really fighting. On March 20, 1946, instead of the two former Operational Bureaus of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, the "Bureau of the Council of Ministers of the USSR consisting of the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers" was formed. L.P. was approved as the chairman of the unified Bureau. Beria, and his deputies - N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin.

According to the distribution of duties between the Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers, by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 674 of March 28, 1946, Beria was assigned: the ministries of communications; ferrous metallurgy; non-ferrous metallurgy; the coal industry of the western regions of the USSR; the coal industry of the eastern regions of the USSR; the oil industry of the western and southern regions of the USSR; the oil industry of the eastern regions of the USSR; transport engineering; construction of fuel industry enterprises; internal affairs; state security and state control, as well as Glavgaztopprom.

L. P. Beria (second from left) and I. V. Stalin surrounded by the leaders of the USSR

I.V. Stalin (first from left), G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beria on podium of the Mausoleum during the celebration of May 1 in Moscow

L.P. Beria (third from left in the first row) among the leadership of the USSR

In total - a dozen of the most important ministries for Lavrenty Beria! The same amount was assigned only to Alexei Kosygin, but he was a “pure” business executive, and Beria, among other things, was also the largest political figure, not counting the worries about the Uranium problem. Even Nikolai Voznesensky, who imagines himself an unsurpassed manager, had eleven positions, and less important ones. Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov, however, had seventeen positions, but only five "ministerial", including the Ministry of Cinematography, as well as the Committees for Measures and Measuring Instruments, for the Arts, the Council for the Russian Orthodox Church, etc.

Alexandrov Anatoly Petrovich (1903-1994) - Soviet physicist, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR (1953). Three times Hero of Socialist Labor. President of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in 1975–1986 Winner of the Lenin Prize, the State Prize of the USSR and four Stalin Prizes. One of the founders of the Soviet nuclear power industry.

Andreev was in charge of agriculture, Mikoyan - mainly - "food" "block". Kaganovich led two major ministries and the Committee for Architecture. For Molotov "listed"

Ministry of Justice, Committee for Higher Education, Committee for Radio and Broadcasting and TASS. Stalin

controlled the Ministry of Armaments, and as a minister, the Ministry of the Armed Forces of the USSR. From

the list of ministries assigned to Beria on March 28, 1946, it can be seen that at that time in the USSR there was not one Ministry of the Coal Industry, but two: the coal industry of the western regions of the USSR and the coal industry of the eastern regions of the USSR. A curious and characteristic episode is connected with this, not very durable, reorganization, told in his memoirs by the “atomic” academician Yu.B. Khariton, who, in turn, was told about him by the "atomic" General A.S. Alexandrov. Anatoly Sergeevich Aleksandrov worked with Beria since the war through the GKO line, since 1947 he was the deputy head of the PGU, and from 1951 to 1955 he led the Sarov KB-11, which developed atomic bombs.

So, in March 1946, when the Council of People's Commissars was reformed into the Council of Ministers, it was decided to divide the People's Commissariat of the Coal Industry of the USSR into two ministries - the coal industry of the western regions and the coal industry of the eastern regions. The first was to be headed by the former "general" minister V.V. Vakhrushev, the second - D.G. Onika. Beria was supposed to share

them - as the curator of the industry. Beria, having called Vakhrushev and Onika to his place, invited them to share everything, including personnel and the social sphere, amicably. After the appointed time, he called the freshly minted ministers again and asked if there were any mutual claims? Vakhrushev said "no", and Onika protested - they say, Vakhrushev took the

best personnel for himself, and sanatoriums, and so on ... Beria's decision was instant: if so, let Vakhrushev take the ministry intended for Onika, and Onika - "Vakhrushev's". And this decision can be cited as an exemplary example in all textbooks on management, because Beria's logic was invincible:

a) if Onika slandered Vakhrushev, and the division was fair, then no one remains offended;

b) if Vakhrushev, dividing his people's commissariat, cheated, now he will pay for it; c)

if Onika was capricious, now he doesn't even give a hint will dare that he had bad "starting" conditions.

There was also an additional benefit here: the case became known in the administrative circles of Moscow (and not only Moscow), and everyone was taught a substantive lesson about the fact that it is more profitable to be honest with Comrade

Beria than dishonest! Later, not only the coal industry underwent reorganization, but the entire system of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers. On February 8, 1947, the Politburo Decree on the new organization of the work of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted and eight branch bureaus were formed. They were headed by L.P. Beria, N.A. Voznesensky, K.E. Voroshilov, L.M.

Kaganovich, A.N. Kosygin, G.M. Malenkov, A.I. Mikoyan and M.Z. Saburov. At first, Stalin intended to have six bureaus (for agriculture, industry, fuel, transport, domestic trade and culture), but life itself made it necessary to have a more extensive management of the economy. At the same time, Stalin hesitated over who to give the bureau for industry - Voznesensky or Beria, to whom the bureau for fuel - Beria or Malenkov, and to whom the bureau for agriculture - Andreev, Voznesensky or Malenkov? As a result, G.M. Malenkov headed the Bureau of Agriculture, N.A. Voznesensky - in metallurgy and chemistry, L.P. Beria - for fuel and power plants. In addition, as the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Beria was entrusted with the supervision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, as well as the construction of multi-storey buildings in Moscow. (In brackets, I note that the monitoring of the Ministry of State Security was carried out separately, along the lines of the Politburo, and was led by the Secretary of the Central Committee A.A. Kuznetsov

Already on February 27, 1947 - three weeks later - Beria's bureau (for fuel and power plants) was merged with Kaganovich's bureau (for transport and communications) into one bureau for fuel and transport, chaired by the unchanged Stalinist "Figaro" - Lavrenty Beria. **As a result, under any structure for managing the post-war economy of the USSR, Beria's duties in the Council of Ministers of the USSR were paramount, leading.**

BERIA also supervised all major post-war hydrotechnical projects of the USSR, and on July 5, 1951, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR V.S. Ryasnoy reported to him on the progress of work on the construction of the Volga-Baltic waterway. And on July 6, 1951, the Minister of the River Fleet Z.A. Shashkov reported to Beria on the transport use of the White Sea-Baltic Canal named after Stalin, the Mariinsky system, the Moscow Canal, the Rybinsk and Uglich locks on the Volga ...

Verkhne-Svirskaya hydroelectric power station (Verkhnesvirskaya HPP) is a hydroelectric power station on the Svir River in the Leningrad Region, in the city of Podporozhye. The construction of the hydroelectric power station began in 1938 and ended in 1952. Part of the Volga-Baltic waterway



Motor ship "Joseph Stalin" enters the Volga-Don Canal. June 27, 1952

Beria oversaw the construction of the Volga-Don canal - the Volga Don. On June 13, 1946, the Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR S.N. Kruglov and the head and chief engineer of the Hydroproject of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, the largest Soviet hydraulic engineer S.Ya. Zhuk sent a letter to Stalin and Beria, with an indicative postscript at the end of the letter: “The main indicators of the Volga-Don waterway were sent only to Comrade. Beria". On September 11, 1948, Kruglov and Zhuk once again reported to Beria about the progress of construction, and Beria writes a resolution on this letter, which is given below in full - Beria’s personality and business style are clearly visible from it: “Government decisions ***from On 27/ II and 19/ III-1948, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR allocated everything necessary to ensure work according to the plan for the current year and prepare for the construction of the Volga-Don Canal in 1949. Meanwhile, preparatory work at Volgodonstroy is still going poorly, which is explained by the failure to take proper measures on the part***

Glavgidrostroy is fighting poorly for the implementation of these decisions of the Government. You need to send Comrade Zhuk to construction

to provide assistance on the spot. And comrade Rapoport (head of the Glavgidrostroy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, concurrently from 14.01.49 and head of Volgodonstroy, - S.K.) to force them to properly deal with the issues of material and technical support of Volgodonstroy.

The Volga-Don is one of the most important construction projects of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR - therefore, you are personally obliged to deal with this construction site on a daily basis, helping Glavgidrostroy.

Beria's instructions did not work for the future, and on October 31, 1949, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 4960-1909s "On strengthening the management of the construction of the Volga-Don waterway" was issued - "Beria" in style and spirit, that is, accurate, businesslike, specific as in part ascertaining shortcomings, and ways to correct them. Among other things, the Decree stated: “... in the process of selecting management and engineering and construction workers for Volgodonstroy, the Personnel Department of the USSR Ministry of Internal

Affairs (head of the Department, comrade Obruchnikov) Glavgidrostroy and Volgodonstroy (head comrade Rapoport) appointed persons to some leadership positions, not inspiring confidence (Raikin, Grinman, Kurzon, Lyakhovetsky). For a long time, a deputy head of Volgodonstroy for general issues was not appointed, ... there is no deputy chief engineer for hydraulic structures ... ”, etc. The Decree of the Council of Ministers ordered a number of measures to be taken. In particular , **Glavgidrostroy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR was transferred from Moscow directly to the construction of the Volga-Don** and merged with Volgodonstroy. Beetle. N.A. was appointed by the same Decree as an engineer for hydraulic structures. Filimonov (he, like Zhuk, received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor for the construction of the Volga-Don Canal in 1952). It is characteristic that in the

Decree it was written: “Save for Comrade Filimonov N.A. living space occupied by him in the city of Leningrad”. Beria did not even forget about such a seemingly “little thing” - on a state scale! However, Beria was well aware that those from whom he demanded to "fight" for the implementation of decisions

The governments, sparing no nerves and time, are very sensitive to the fact that Stalin and Beria do not forget about such "trifles". The

construction was carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, mostly by prisoners, but it was by no means "slave labor" in "unbearable conditions." The work was carried out not under the "Dubinushka", but behind the levers of the machines. This can be seen from the normative levels of mechanization of work established at Volgodonstroy: earthworks - 97%; preparation and transportation of concrete - 100%; concrete laying - 98%; rubble stone mining - 100%; stone mining and crushing it into rubble - 100%; extraction of gravel and sand - 100%; pile driving and installation of metal structures - 99%; construction of residential and industrial buildings - 90%; fastening of slopes and the bottom of the channel with reinforced concrete slabs - 50%;

By the spring of 1952, work on the Volga-Don was being completed; on May 19, 1952, the Government Commission for the acceptance of finished structures of the Volga-Don waterway was approved. And on June 12, 1952, the Minister of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR S.N. Kruglov and his deputy I.A. Serov, in a purely business note addressed to Beria, reported on the progress of the first postings of ships through the new channel.

VOLGO-DON was just one of the many everyday "peaceful" concerns of Beria, except for the "defensive" "cases Nos. 1,2 and 3", to which he was daily obliged - officially obliged! - Give half of your working time. Beria knew well the cadres of Soviet hydraulic engineers, but he also oversaw issues related to railway construction in the North and the Far East, the construction of a timber port in the Igarka region on the Yenisei, and a ferry crossing from the mainland to Sakhalin through the Tatar Strait.

Construction of lock No. 1 of the Volga-Don shipping canal

Construction of lock No. 2 of the Volga-Don shipping canal

Reports of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs on the implementation of annual plans for the extraction of gold, platinum, silver, rare metals, cobalt, tin, etc. in the late 1940s and early 1950s went to three addresses: Stalin, Beria and Malenkov. But Beria also made an outstanding contribution to the restoration and post-war development of the Soviet ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy, especially in the first, most difficult, years of the recovery period. Beria was also responsible for the restoration of coal mines, but oil has always been a separate article for Beria - here he has become an expert since the time of the Caucasus, understanding the problem better than many "pure" professionals.

Construction of lock No. 11 of the Volga-Don shipping canal

Meeting on the occasion of the opening of the Volga-Don shipping canal. June 1952

The triumphal arch crowning the entrance to the Volga-Don shipping canal named after V.I. IN AND. Lenin. Volgograd. 1952

It is worth dwelling on oil in more detail ... In a speech at the pre-election meeting of voters of the Stalinist electoral district of Moscow on February 9, 1946, Stalin spoke - as about the most important long-term task - of the need to increase annual oil production to 60 million tons. Stalin said that it would probably take three new five-year plans, if not more, to solve this problem, and added: “But this thing can be done, and we must
do".

Under Stalin's directives, the Soviet Union was to produce approximately 60 million tons of crude oil by 1961. Decades after Beria's assassination, former Oil Minister Baibakov claimed that such a plan was a de Beria adventure, and that Beria irresponsibly provoked Stalin into the figure of 60 million tons - allegedly without consulting experts. But was Baibakov right? On the eve of the war, the USSR produced 34 million tons of oil per year, immediately

after the war - 19 million tons. And in 1960, when the Khrushchevites had long anathematized the name of Beria, 148 (one hundred and forty-eight) million tons of oil were produced in the USSR, not counting the fact that by 1960 natural gas production had increased 15 (fifteen) times. So who knew the possibilities and reserves of the oil industry better - the "professional" Baibakov, or the "amateur" Beria?



Restoration of the Kochegarka mine in Donbass

Oil fields in the Yablonev Ravine (Samara region). 1946 year

And just as professionally, Lavrenty Beria delved into issues, for example, the mechanization of logging, timber rafting, the development of the paper industry - documents on this subject have been preserved in the archives. And they survived - despite all subsequent anti-Beria purges and erasures of archives - because here the story of Beria's “cutting out” with a razor from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia was repeated. The main - personal, article about Beria from the 5th volume of TSB-2 was removed, and about numerous scattered across various volumes

mentioning the name and merits of Beria was forgotten. Yes, and it was impossible to remove all these references, except to order Beria's name to be blacked out with ink, or to remove many volumes of the TSB from public and private libraries

completely. The same happened with archival documents. They destroyed them, giving us the true, and not the demonized Beria, in a multitude, but they destroyed, mainly, documents relating to his political activities. With the activities of Beria in the sphere of the Soviet military and post-war economy, this turned out to be impossible - otherwise the relevant state archives would have been simply devastated. During the war and post-war years, tens of thousands of important documents passed through the hands of Beria, and all contained business visas signed “L. Beria" or simply "LB".

LAST - in a row, but not least - what should be said about the victories of Lavrenty Beria in the name of the economic power of Russia, this is to highlight his role in the formation in the USSR of new, science-intensive, as they began to say later, branches of the economy and in the development of science and technology. This side of the post-war activities of Lavrenty Pavlovich was never emphasized, and it is not immediately realized ***with all clarity*** how much Beria personally did here. And he did surprisingly a lot - personally, by himself!

Beria oversaw the Atomic Project, work on the air defense of Moscow and later on long-range ballistic missiles. Each of these projects was especially science-intensive, and the greatest number of various problems were created by the needs of "atomic" work. And in everything, ***absolutely in everything,*** significant problems related to the needs of the Atomic Project, Beria entered in the most thorough and attentive way. Through it went a daily huge flow of not empty stationery, but purely business papers - incoming and outgoing. Incoming he read, delved into them, underlined, imposed resolutions ... Outgoing, prepared taking into account his business instructions and decisions, he edited and signed.

Numerous Decrees and Orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR also went through Beria, which, although often signed in the name of Stalin, were actually endorsed by Beria - he had such

the right delegated to him by Stalin. Stalin's role in the post-war leadership of the country was undoubtedly outstanding, but by the early 1950s, Stalin's efficiency had declined. The operational management of defense work, and in general the work of the economy, passed to Beria. Everything closed on Beria and then, fertilized by his decisions and energy, returned to levels where decisions were translated into a material result. Below is an “abstract” ***of only a***

part of the Soviet post-war “high-tech” achievements ***in only one*** case entrusted to Beria - “No. 1”, that is, “atomic”, where the organizing role of “LP” turned out to be especially significant and outstanding.

Let's start with the problem of obtaining pure uranium, that is, uranium purified from impurities. Without uranium, there is no weapon-grade bomb! And the purification of uranium is an extremely difficult scientific and technical task. Smith's book "Atomic Energy for Military Purposes" reported that "this task was one of the most difficult for America and required the involvement of large specialists and a number of firms for a long time."

Pure argon and metallic calcium were needed - without them, it is impossible to organize the production of uranium in metallic form. In the USSR, there was a small production of argon, but this argon contained a large amount of nitrogen and could not be used to melt uranium. There was no calcium production in the Soviet Union before. Before World War II, there were only two calcium metal plants in the world: one in France and one in Germany. In 1939, even before the occupation of France by the Germans, the Americans built a third plant for the production of calcium metal using technology obtained from France. No one was going to transfer modern technologies to the Soviet

Union, and a new original technology for the production of high-purity calcium was developed by employees of the Uranium Combine and introduced into production there. Among the difficulties in obtaining pure metallic uranium is the fact that the

content of impurities in uranium, which inhibit or stop nuclear reactions, is allowed at no more than millionths of a percent (1 ***gram*** of impurities per 100 ***tons*** of pure product). Traces of impurities make uranium

unusable from weapons positions. Until 1945, the USSR did not have not only highly sensitive methods for determining impurities in uranium, but also did not have the necessary reagents for fine analytical work. And to obtain pure uranium, very pure chemicals and reagents are required - more than 200 different reagents and over 50 different chemicals of extremely high purity!

In the United States, more than a dozen firms were engaged in the manufacture of chemically pure reagents and reagents, including the concerns Dupont de Nemours and Carbide and Carbon Corporation, associated with the German concern I.G. Farbenidustri". Soviet chemists had to solve the problem of creating the production of dozens of chemicals of exceptionally high purity, which had not previously been manufactured in the country, on their own. In addition to the need for especially pure chemicals, the production of which

had to be organized, a completely new apparatus for chemical processes was needed. Most of the materials used in chemical engineering turned out to be unsuitable for these purposes - common grades of stainless steels

didn't fit.

And the problem of new special materials! .. Graphite

was required of such a degree of purity, which was not known to any branch of industry in the Soviet Union. Without ultra-high purity graphite, a nuclear reactor is impossible, and even the most grades of graphite, the Soviet industry until 1945, contained impurities 100 times more than necessary. And in a short time, as a result of persistent searches, it was possible to create an industrial technology for obtaining the purest graphite. It was necessary to reorganize the production of pure beryllium oxide, pure thorium oxide, calcium chloride, calcium oxide, a number of acids of an exceptionally high degree

of purity, special rubber and rubber products, which had not previously been produced in the country.

To create atomic aggregates, it is necessary to have "heavy" water. But the production of "heavy water" is a complex and energy-intensive process. During the war, the Allies bombed a "heavy" water plant in Norway that worked for the German nuclear power plant.

project, and this was one of the reasons that the Germans did not have time to make

their bomb. In America, all information about the production of "heavy" water was available many years before the start of work on the atomic problem, and in the Soviet Union it was necessary to begin this work with research on the study of methods for obtaining "heavy" water and methods of its control. It was necessary to develop these methods, create a cadre of

specialists, build factories ... And all this had to be done in a very short time.

POSSIBLY, the reader is tired... But,

having ***slightly*** touched upon the topic of new materials, we have not yet said anything about, for example, the problems of precision instrumentation. Physicists, chemists, research engineers of the Atomic Project needed new and diverse instruments of high sensitivity and high accuracy. In tsarist Russia there was no instrument making. The pre-war five-year plans gave it, however, after the war, the instrument-making plants of Kharkov, Kyiv, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Rostov, and Stalingrad were destroyed. Factories in Leningrad and Moscow also suffered during the war years and were not fully restored. It was necessary to restore the destroyed factories and build new ones. And new requirements for the accuracy of instruments created new difficulties - our industry had not previously manufactured such precise instruments. In the USA, only 78 firms were engaged in

the manufacture of instruments for measuring and controlling nuclear radiation, and long-term ties with instrument-making firms in Germany, England, France, and Switzerland made it easier for US specialists to design new instruments. The instrument-making industry of the Soviet Union lagged behind - this industry was the youngest. Attempts to acquire instruments abroad met with direct opposition from US government organizations. US firms refused to accept orders from Amtorg, the Soviet foreign trade organization for US trade. And for one nuclear reactor alone, it was required to install about eight thousand various kinds of instruments.

There was only one way out - to organize the development and manufacture of new devices. Among them were many completely new ones, working on completely new principles that had not previously been used in world instrument making. From 1946 to 1952, instrument-making plants of the USSR manufactured 135,500 instruments of new designs and more than 230,000 standard instruments for the needs of the nuclear industry. Along with the creation of instrumentation and various kinds of regulators, a series of special manipulators was developed and manufactured. The manipulator reproduces the movements of the arms and hands of a person and allows you to remotely perform subtle and complex operations. The question of

furnaces for smelting uranium was acute. There was nowhere to get such furnaces - vacuum furnaces were built in the USA, and the US government imposed a ban on the sale of such furnaces to the Soviet Union. And the Soviet trust "Elektropech" created 50 different types of electric furnace installations.

Without vacuum equipment, the development of the most important physical research and the operation of engineering and physical structures is impossible, and before the start of the Atomic Project in the USSR, scientific research work on vacuum technology was limited to two laboratories. At the same time, more than 3,000 units of vacuum gauges alone were required for 1947 alone, over 4,500 fore-vacuum pumps, and over 2,000 high-vacuum diffusion pumps. Special high-vacuum oils, putties, vacuum-tight rubber products, vacuum valves, valves, bellows were required ... And we also did this - ourselves! Our research institutes were able to create powerful high-vacuum units with a capacity of 10-20 and even 40 thousand liters per second. In terms of power and quality, Soviet high-vacuum pumps of the early 1950s were superior to the latest American models.

LIKE lists go on and on, and it's easy to get bored just ***reading*** about all the things that needed to be done, and not one after the other, but all at once, in parallel! And what was it like for Beria ***to manage*** this process, organize it, control its course?

Of course, Beria did not develop methods for obtaining, for example, pure beryllium oxide, he did not design plants for its production, but those who did this had ***only one*** task. And Beria had ***hundreds of*** questions in his head - from the construction of barracks for workers at "atomic" facilities to the organization of fundamental research in the field of physics. And the significance of his constructive influence on the course of work was such that Kurchatov, even after the arrest of Beria, was not afraid to declare that without Beria there would be no Bomba.

At the initial stage of work in nuclear physics, the Soviet Union did not have the powerful accelerators needed to produce high-energy nuclear particles. The problem of accelerators also became a subject of concern for the Special Committee under the leadership of Beria and Beria personally. In Armenia, on Mount Alagez, at an altitude of 3,200 meters above sea level, a station was built to study cosmic rays with a magnet weighing 55 tons; a high-altitude flight laboratory was created near Moscow to study cosmic particles at an altitude of 20–30 kilometers using balloons. . And in February 1946, a decision was made to build the most powerful cyclotron in the world, which would produce protons with an energy of half a billion electron volts. The accelerator was supposed to serve all the main institutes and laboratories working in the field of nuclear physics.

The American cyclotron at Berkeley with a magnet weighing 4,200 tons was regarded in the world literature as one of the remarkable structures of our time. The Soviet cyclotron was supposed to surpass the American one not only in the size of the electromagnet (the magnet of the Soviet cyclotron weighed 7,000 tons) and in the energy of accelerated particles, but also in its technical perfection. The cyclotron (Installation "M") was built in the area of the Ivankovskaya hydroelectric power station, 125 kilometers from Moscow, by December 1949. The main building, which housed the electromagnet, was a monolithic reinforced concrete structure up to thirty-six meters high with walls two meters thick. Today it is hard to believe that such a thing was done ***in such*** a time frame.

Сов. секретно

Товарищу Берия Л.П.

1. Нынешний уровень знаний об атомном ядре и космических лучах позволяет предполагать, что при помощи частиц, ускоренных до энергии 250 миллионов вольт и выше, можно перейти к открытиям новых физических явлений (открытию новых элементов, новых способов получать атомную энергию из более дешевых источников, чем уран).

2. Для получения частиц такой энергии необходимо, как устанавливают расчеты, иметь мощный циклотрон с диаметров полюсов не менее 3,5 метров.

Целесообразно, однако, построить циклотрон с диаметром полюсов 4,5–5 метров, чтобы получить энергию частиц, большую, чем это может дать самый мощный циклотрон (Лоуренса).

3. Циклотронная установка должна состоять из слеующих основных частей:

- электромагнита циклотрона,
- разгонной вакуумной камеры,
- мотор-генератора для питания обмоток электромагнита с комплектующим оборудованием и аппаратурой,
- высокочастотной импульсной установки для генерирования поля высокой частоты между дуантами разгонной камеры,
- вакуумной установки для создания высокого вакуума внутри разгонной камеры.

И. Курчатов

26. I 1946 г.

Letter to I.V. Kurchatova L.P. Beria (dated January 26, 1946), where it is proposed to create a powerful cyclotron for the development of physical research, which would make it possible to obtain particle energies higher than at the most powerful accelerator available at that time in the world - the Lawrence cyclotron

СОВ. СЕКРЕТНО
(Особая папка)

СОВЕТ МИНИСТРОВ СССР

ПОСТАНОВЛЕНИЕ № 1764 –766сс
от " 13 " августа 194 6 г. Москва, Кремль.

О строительстве мощного циклотрона (установки "М")

В целях дальнейшего развития научных исследований в области атомного ядра Совет Министров Союза ССР ПОСТАНОВЛЯЕТ:

1. Принять предложение академиков Вавилова, Курчатова, Алиханова и профессоров Скобельцына и Арцимовича о строительстве мощного циклотрона (установки "М") с электромагнитом, имеющим следующие основные параметры:

вес электромагнита – 6-7 тыс. т
диаметр полюсов – около 5 000 мм
воздушный зазор между полюсами – 1 000-1 200 мм
индукция в воздушном зазоре – 14 000 гаусс

2. Утвердить:

а) место строительство мощного циклотрона (установки "М") – район Иваньковской ГЭС:

б) срок окончания сооружения установки "М" и организации лаборатории при ней – 1 кв. 1949 г.

8. Утвердить начальником строительства установки «М» (строительство №833 МВД СССР) т.Лепилова А.П.

Председатель
Совета Министров Союза ССР И.Сталин

Управляющий делами
Совета Министров СССР Я.Чадаев

Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of August 13, 1946 No. 1764-766ss "On the construction of a powerful cyclotron (installation" M ")"

On May 2, 1949, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the construction of a powerful ring proton accelerator - the synchrophasotron, for an energy of 10 billion electron volts! Started by development under the control of Beria, the synchrophasotron was put into operation after the death of Stalin and Beria - on December 5, 1957. But this was also one of the victories of Beria - already posthumous.

ANOTHER, and also, in many ways - posthumous, Beria's victory was the powerful development in the USSR since the late 1940s of domestic computer technology. How much has been said about the "clamping of cybernetics" in the 1940s, which allegedly led the USSR to lag behind in the development of computers. And work on Soviet computers began in 1948 at the Energy Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and at the Institute of Electrical Engineering of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian SSR under the leadership of S.A. Lebedev. December 4, 1948 I.S. Brook and B.I. Rameev received a copyright certificate for the invention "Automatic digital electro car".

The building where the synchrocyclotron was mounted



Synchrophasotron. Commissioned in 1957

On January 11, 1949, the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was adopted on the development of the Large Electronic Computing Machine (BESM) by Lebedev and the Strela by Bazilevsky-Rameev. Since the spring of 1949, the Ministry of Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation of the USSR, in cooperation with the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, began organizing the design and production of calculating, analytical and mathematical electronic digital machines. On April 30, 1949, the Minister of Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation of the USSR Pyotr Parshin, the same age and old "frame" of Beria, reported to the latter:

"... The great successes achieved in recent years in the development of pulsed electronics have created the prerequisites for the implementation of new computer technology - high-speed automatic digital machines capable of performing calculations at the rate of a thousand or more arithmetic operations per second ..."

The minister asked Beria to oblige the PSU "to take part in the preparation of technical specifications for the design of an electronic digital machine." This is what is now called “computers”, which are needed for calculations of thermonuclear charges, air defense systems, and dams of new hydroelectric power stations. In 1952, Lebedev's Small Electronic Computing Machine (MESM) began to be practically used. We are told that in the USSR of Stalin and Beria, computers were considered a bourgeois invention, and exactly a year before Stalin's death - on March 6, 1952, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instructed "on the construction of a building to accommodate high-speed mathematical computers and computational mathematical bureaus of the USSR

Academy of Sciences ". Beria's flair for the new was amazingly developed. And **all our achievements in the field of nuclear physics, rocketry, aviation and computer technology, including the successes and discoveries of a fundamental nature, obtained by the end of the "Khrushchev" 1950s,** were **based on the scientific and technical policy of Stalin and Beria, who understood that the new Russia needs to be on an equal footing with world scientific leaders, espec**

The world's first nuclear power plant ... The world's first nuclear icebreaker "Lenin" ... The second in the world - after the American "Nautilus", the nuclear submarine "Lenin Komsomol" ... The world's first intercontinental ballistic missile - "Gagarin's" "seven" R-7 ... All this was conceived and started in the Soviet Union by Stalin and Beria, and was embodied in metal when neither Stalin nor Beria was already alive, when Stalin was slandered by Khrushchev, and Beria was completely defamed.

Beria was sincerely attentive to scientists and to their requests, both business and domestic. Khrushchev did not like scientists - a natural reaction of a narrow-minded bureaucrat in power. Beria oversaw work on ballistic missiles with an understanding of the future, and Khrushchev's passion for missiles was purely amateurish.

Petr Ivanovich Parshin (1899-1970) - People's Commissar of Mortar Weapons of the USSR (1941-1946), People's Commissar of Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation of the USSR (1946), Minister of Mechanical Engineering and Instrumentation of the USSR (1946-1953, 1954-1956)

Kondratieva types the English text for automatic translation on the BESM computer. 1956

MESM. At the control panel from left to right: engineer S. B. Pogrebinsky and candidate of sciences L. N. Dashevsky, who participated in the design of MESM, 1951

Computer "Strela"

Beria respected big people - to the same Sergei Korolev, however, under Beria, Korolev would never have been able to pursue the line that he considered correct - Korolev, but which was objectively incorrect, and it happened. Khrushchev did not respect anyone, and even more so - independent people, humanly large. But, like any arrogant ignoramus, Khrushchev was inclined to pretend that he "understood" what the professionals told him, although they were far from always right.

Nuclear-powered icebreaker "Lenin" - the world's first surface vessel with a nuclear power plant



The R-7, a two-stage intercontinental ballistic missile with a detachable warhead, is being transported to the combat position. On the basis of the R-7, a whole family of rockets was created -

carriers of the middle class, who made a great contribution to the development space.

Obninsk NPP is a nuclear power plant located in the city of Obninsk, Kaluga Region. The world's first nuclear power plant connected to a common electrical grid; also the first nuclear power plant of the Soviet Union

"Leninsky Komsomol", originally K-3 - the first Soviet nuclear submarine

Beria was not deceived by the broadcast promises of the developers of new weapons systems, he quickly caught the weaknesses of certain projects, and Khrushchev was essentially unable to object, and every now and then went on about the developers, and if he was cool with them, it was stupid, out of pure "taste".

Khrushchev did not know how to see the essence of the problem - he did not have enough knowledge, nor grip, nor the scale of Beria for this. Beria knew how to see the essence. He knew how not to waste time on trifles when it was justified, but he knew how to make atomic scientists count even a penny - as was the case after the first successes of the Atomic Project. And Khrushchev in his “memoirs” did not hesitate to admit: “It costs millions to launch a rocket. Now I can’t specifically name how much, not because of secrecy, but simply ***I don’t know*** (bold italics are mine everywhere, - ***S.K.),*** but these are ***huge*** funds. For Beria, such “quantitative” assessments were impossible - he himself did not tolerate or allow anything vague, and he brought up his subordinates in the same spirit. Therefore, the best manager not only of socialism, but of the whole world history, Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria became after the war the biggest ally of Stalin and the entire Soviet people in the final transformation of Russia into a powerful scientific, technical and industrial power.

The mature Russia of Stalin and Beria set its sights on world leadership in the interests of not only the peoples of the Soviet Union, but also all the creative, creative forces of the world. Such a prospect was

real, and one of the visible symbols of victorious Russia were the high-rise buildings of Moscow. Majestic and at the same time slender, the "skyscrapers" rushed up and built a new architectural image of the Soviet capital.

And this was also one of Beria's personal victories.

Twelfth victory 1947–1952. Monument for the ages: "skyscrapers" over Moscow

IN THE BEGINNING of 1943, Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich, fulfilling Stalin's instructions, arrived in Tbilisi, and wrote from there to his daughter Maya, an architect by profession: ***"Dear and beloved Mayusya! Thank you for ... a detailed description of the celebration of Zholtovsky. Despite some of his oddities, he certainly deserved the order and honoring the anniversary ... I wanted to write to him, but not the s***

Ivan Zholtovsky became an academician of architecture in 1909, but he realized his best projects in the Soviet period, as did Alexei Shchusev, four times Stalin Prize laureate. Before the revolution, Shchusev built the Kazansky railway station in Moscow, in Soviet Russia he is known for the project of the Mausoleum of V.I. Lenin, the NKVD building on Dzerzhinsky Square, the Komsomolskaya Koltsevaya metro station. And then Kaganovich wrote: ***"... Zholtovsky is a follower of the classics to fanaticism, while Shchusev is an eclecticist, he takes a little from everyone, but most of all he is a Baroque. However, I must say that the building of IMEL*** (the Tbilisi branch of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, ***- S.K.),*** built by Shchusev , ***for which he received the Stalin Prize, is remarkable both externally and internally, it is clear that Shchusev is being rebuilt. He gave powerful granite columns on 5 floors, and inside a wonderful location and decoration - rich (marble) and modest. But, oddly enough*** (bold italics mine, ***- S.K.), Zholtovsky's influence is visible in this building ... Shchusev, of course, did not do this consciously, but he is a businesslike and practical man; when he was convinced that Soviet*** (with a capital letter from Kaganovich ***- S.K.) architecture does not abandon the best elements of the old heritage and that classical forms are applied to life, he also applied his remarkable abilities ... "***

Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich (1893-1991) - state, economic and party leader, close associate of I. V. Stalin

Kaganovich was engaged in self-education all his life and was a man of deep thoughts and a precise look. Therefore, he caught the unusualness for the “traditional” Shchusev of the decisions taken in the building of the Tbilisi branch of IMEL, but saw in it the influence of Zholtovsky ...

A - Zholtovsky?

The reconstruction of Tbilisi was carried out with the active participation of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia, and Beria's style in the new look of the Georgian capital manifested itself clearly and quite clearly. So could Beria bypass such an important element

of the

architectural renovation of Tbilisi as the IMEL building? Don't think. At the same time, as Kaganovich noted, Shchusev was, on the one hand, an eclecticist, and on the other hand, as Kaganovich noted, he was a businesslike and practical person. With regard to Zholtovsky, Shchusev was so jealous that even on the anniversary he could not resist polite hairpins addressed to the hero of the day, and it does not seem that Shchusev really experienced the influence of Zholtovsky while working in Tbilisi - they were each his own

head. But Shchusev could not but listen to the opinion of Beria, if only because Beria was, after all, a customer. Of course, if Beria, like Agafya Tikhonovna from Gogol's "Marriage", wished to have a building in the style of Corbusier, but with columns of all classical orders alternating along the facade, then Shchusev would hardly have listened to such wishes. But Beria had a taste - we can judge this not only by Tbilisi, but also by how closed "nuclear" cities were built from the very beginning, to the general plans and development of which Beria could not be indifferent either. Therefore, the assumption that Beria could influence even

such a large and proud architect as Shchusev will not be unacceptable. Beria was educated at the Baku Construction and Architectural School, and the rapid construction in pre-revolutionary Baku gave the novice architect many reasons for reflection and self-education. "Oil" Baku grew by leaps and bounds, and although the main new population - oil workers, huddled in barracks on the outskirts, urban construction in Baku developed rapidly. Luxurious mansions and palaces of oilmen appeared in the center, country residences were built. Yes, and the "middle class" in Baku was not poor, so the massive urban development was significant. All this, of course, contributed both to the development of construction and architectural education in Baku, and to the development of intelligent neophytes who are formed in the school that Beria graduated from.

For the first time, he was able to prove himself as an architect and city planner, reconstructing socialist Tbilisi - at an age slightly older than the age of Christ. And when he was already under half a hundred, Beria again got the opportunity to prove himself in the business that he fell in love with from his youth, but which he could not surrender to for reasons from
not dependent on him.

FEBRUARY 8, 1947, the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was issued, according to which, in addition to other duties, the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.P. Beria was entrusted with the supervision of the construction of multi-storey buildings in Moscow. First of all, high-rise buildings were meant, although mass multi-storey large-block construction using in-line methods and techniques also did not escape Stalin's attention - he rightly believed that post-war Moscow should not spread like dough from kneading, but be built up 8-14- storey buildings. Since the beginning of the 1950s, surprisingly much has been done in this regard, and even on the streets far from the center of Moscow, multi-storey buildings began to appear, which greatly decorated the capital. All this was done under the supervision of Beria - within the framework of that second "half of the working time", which was not busy with cases Nos. 1, 2 and 3 ... In 1947, at the suggestion of Stalin, a separate Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR was
adopted on the construction of eight high-rise buildings. The Decree formulated the requirements for their architecture: “The proportions and silhouettes ... of buildings must be original and their architectural and artistic composition must be linked to
the historical architecture of the city and the silhouette of the future Palace of Soviets. In accordance with this, the designed buildings should not repeat the samples of multi-storey buildings known abroad ... "

The crown of Soviet high-rise architecture was to be the building of the Moscow State University on the Lenin Hills - by November 1951 it had already been basically erected. Residential buildings were to grow on Vosstaniya Square and on Kotelnicheskaya Embankment; on Dorogomilovskaya embankment and on Kalanchevskaya street

(Komsomolskaya Square) - hotels "Ukraine" and "Leningradskaya"; and in Zaryadye, on Lermontovskaya Square at the Red Gate and on Smolenskaya Square, there are three administrative buildings.

1. Residential building on Kudrinskaya Square - a building decorated with many bas-reliefs and sculptures, popularly nicknamed "Gastronom". 2. The Leningradskaya Hotel is the smallest of

the skyscrapers, designed in the Moscow baroque style. Today it belongs to the Hilton hotel chain.

3. The main building of Moscow State University is the tallest of Moscow skyscrapers, one of the symbols of Moscow, is located on Sparrow Hills.

4. The building on the Red Gate Square - residential and administrative premises are located here, the decor combines classical and ancient Russian motifs. 5. The building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the first of the

Stalinist skyscrapers, made in a restrained classical style, the only one that does not have a star on the spire. 6. Residential building on Kotelnicheskaya embankment - harmonious

the building at the confluence of the rivers, otherwise called the "Yauz Gate".

7. Hotel Ukraina is a miracle on Kutuzovsky Prospekt, which at one time was strongly criticized, and now it is impossible to imagine the appearance of Moscow without it. Today it houses the Radisson Royal Hotel.

In total - eight, and in the high-rise building on Smolenskaya Square the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR was to be located, and at the Red Gate - the Ministry of Railways. Each of the buildings and their very

purpose were

symbol and lighthouse.

Moscow State University is ***the height***

of education. Magnificent residential buildings are a landmark for all builders of the USSR. The landmark is not so much a technical one - you can't build a high-rise building in the regional center, but a moral, professional one.

Hotels are the high hospitality of the new Moscow. The buildings

of the ministries are the high greatness of Russia as a mighty world power. Each building had its

own architects - the color of Soviet architecture, and the appearance of these buildings in the capital of the USSR brought to life a new, optimistic-sounding word "skyscrapers", and this also had a deep meaning. Our "skyscrapers" could not be called "skyscrapers". The skyscrapers were designed by Posokhin, Rudnev, Minkus, Chechulin, Polyakov, Dushkin, Mordvinov, Chernyshev, Gelfreich, Abrosimov, Khryakov… Everyone was a personality, everyone had their own architectural principles. However, in all the projects, it was striking that all of them - with the undoubted originality of their authors, were strikingly similar in their architectural design: slender, logically growing from the surrounding lower stone massifs, crowned with towers with spiers ...

In full accordance with the requirements of the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, the silhouettes of the buildings did not repeat any foreign skyscraper, they were original, but linked to the historically established architecture of Moscow, the architectural and compositional center of which was the Kremlin. All Moscow "skyscrapers" were similar to the Kremlin towers, not only in silhouette, but also in an amazing combination of rigor, grandeur and lightness, aspiration upward.

The height of Moscow buildings reached 275 meters, and at low cloud cover they "scraped" the sky and clouds in the truest sense of the word, but they were not "skyscrapers". The skyscrapers of New York, both the very first and the modern ones, delight with the brilliance of engineering solutions and technologies, but not with architecture. It turns out so because the appearance of skyscrapers was caused by the need to maximize

to use every square foot of expensive land in the center of large cities, and the idea of skyscrapers was born not by creativity, but by huckstering. The Soviet "skyscrapers" are an underlined space. Conceived as ***an integral ensemble on the scale of a huge city,*** high-rise buildings created a vivid image of post-war Moscow. They have become not only its decoration, but also a symbol - just remember the official emblem of the 1980 Moscow Olympiad.

The laying of high-rise buildings in Moscow took place on September 7, 1947, during the celebration of the 800th anniversary of the capital. Each construction site was attended by one of the Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

Construction of the Moscow State University building

The MSU building is completed!

Old and new. Construction of the Moscow State University building

Construction of a skyscraper at the Red Gate. Side view Lermontovskaya ... 1952



Construction of a skyscraper at the Red Gate

Construction of a complex of buildings of Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov opened in full force at the end of 1948, and was completed by September 1, 1953, when the new building first accepted students. The construction department of Moscow State University was led by the most experienced builder Alexei Voronkov and the talented engineer Sergei Balashov, and the gener

Colonel-engineer Alexei Komarovsky was ordered to supervise the construction of Moscow State University and a high-rise administrative building in Zaryadye. The initiative for this appointment belonged to Beria, who knew Komarovsky perfectly and from the best side. From 1944, Major General Komarovsky headed the Glavpromstroy of the NKVD-MVD of the USSR almost until the end of 1951, when he was also “at the suggestion” of Beria, appointed head of the Glavneftespetsstroy of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. Since 1945, Komarovsky was in parallel in the position of one of the deputies of the "atomic" First Main Directorate under the Council of Ministers of the USSR, worked a lot under Beria's hand in the Atomic Project, and it was for this that in 1949 he received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

In A. Komarovsky's book "Notes of a Builder", published by the Military Publishing House in 1972, not a word is said about Beria. But in one place we are talking, no doubt, about Beria: “All further design work was carried out by the design department at a completely exceptional pace simultaneously with the development of the construction of Moscow State University. In many cases, the drawings were sent directly to the paper for production, since the government (read: “Beria”, - ***S.K.)*** trusted us to approve all technical solutions and projects without intermediate instances ... ”Here, Beria’s style is immediately guessed - the one and only, and if it is repeated, then all the same - only Beria's subordinates and associates. For all that, the question remains: “Who gave a single idea for high-rise

building projects?” One of the leading Soviet architects? But everyone who was involved in the work on high-rise projects were independent-thinking people, and would hardly agree to be guided by other people's ideas of colleagues, even objectively and magnificent, in the development of such an epoch-making topic. The article "High-rise buildings", placed in the 9th volume of TSB-2, signed for publication on December 3, 1951, says:

“In high-rise buildings, in accordance with the instructions of the government (sic! - ***S.K.),*** closeness to the traditions of Moscow architecture is combined with a bold desire for new images, imbued with the thought of the present and future of the country of the Soviets. The sculptural completeness of multi-tiered ledge volumes, picturesque silhouettes, rich plastic processing of facades, bring high-rise buildings closer to historical architectural monuments of Moscow. With Palace

Councils (then this project, although formally, but still existed - ***S.K.),*** high-rise buildings will be united by the combination of majestic calmness and balance of the masses common to their architecture with the rapid dynamics of the vertical development of volumes ... ”All this is true and good, but who owned the common

idea? Couldn't eight different teams of architects come to the same solution simultaneously and independently!? At the same time, the seven other teams would not have accepted the idea of one person, because everyone wanted to excel. And with the final design of the Palace of Soviets by Iofan, Shchuko and Gelfreich, the projects of "skyscrapers" had

- in the end - a very relative similarity.

An article in TSB-2 hinted at some impersonal "government instructions", however, the government is also a collection of specific individuals. And in ***this*** team, who was the first to come up with the idea to repeat the silhouettes of the Kremlin in the high-rise buildings of Moscow, what is immediately felt in the guise of “high-rise buildings”? After all, this brilliant idea should have come to someone's head first - whether it was an architect, or a member of the government! So to whom? Stalin? ..

In principle,

this is not

excluded - Stalin was a universal, polyphonic genius, he knew how to feel subtly, and thought originally not only in politics. The modern historian of architecture D. Khmelnitsky, who has long lived in Germany, writes in the book “Architect Stalin” that there are many strange things in the history of the emergence of “high-rise buildings” - the literature does not mention at all who and when developed the layout of high-rise buildings on the general plan of Moscow . Khmelnitsky believes that it was Stalin who was the author of the original urban planning idea and the actual author of the architecture of high-rise buildings, and further explains that since Stalin was not “petty conceited”, he did not claim official authorship. Perhaps so, but then, most likely, the TSB-2 article would still say: "... on the instructions of the great leader, Comrade Stalin", etc. Those who want to once again

suck up to the bearer of supreme power have always been enough in Russia and outside of Russia. But here - in the text of the article, the specific author of the idea was not indicated.

Who then?

Beria was the only architect among the members of the government and the only member of the government among the architects. So wasn't Beria the first to come up with the idea? And if it was

not he who did this, but one of the architects who communicated with him, then Beria could immediately, at the rally, evaluate this idea and bring it to Stalin. And he also appreciated it at the rally and made it a guide for everyone who it was decided to involve in the design of high-rise buildings. Or maybe the idea came to the mind of the first Stalin, he shared it with Beria, and Beria immediately supported her warmly? Of course,

what has been said above is nothing more than hypotheses, conjectures, but the hypotheses are legitimate. No matter how you think about it, Lavrenty Beria was involved in the general plan of the Moscow "skyscrapers". And it is an undoubted historical fact that Beria officially oversaw the design and construction of "skyscrapers", but he did not know how to do anything formally, carrying out "general interference in the affairs of his subordinates". The same D. Khmelnitsky directly states that "apparently" thanks to the brilliant organizational skills of Beria, by 1953, that is, in the shortest possible time, seven out of eight buildings were built. Khmelnitsky calls them "skyscrapers", but here, presumably, his acquired "Europeanism" manifested itself - not "skyscrapers", but high-rise buildings were erected in Stalin and Beria's Moscow! Reliable

evidence has been preserved of how Beria specifically worked with their designers and builders. The author of the book about Stalin, I. I. Chigirin, cites a story about this by Viktor Mikhailovich Abramov, the chief engineer of the project and the chief engineer for the construction of a high-rise building at the Red Gate. In 1951, Abramov turned 43 years old, and during the construction of his "high-rise" he used a daring innovative method of temporarily strengthening the "quicksand" soil under the foundation - he simply froze it. But earthen massifs are not a chicken leg, it required unique, large-scale technologies for freezing soils and appropriate equipment! The huge building was built with a significant ***calculated***

deviation from the vertical (a kind of Leaning Tower of Pisa!), and after defrosting the ground, it had to slowly

slowly swing (!) in the opposite direction and take a strictly vertical position. The engineering concept of Viktor Abramov was as original as it was ***risky.*** However, everything ended brilliantly, and this and other building decisions of Abramov were later included in textbooks. So, on April 14, 1951, on

the eve of May Day, Abramov invited Beria to his place to give a task: a spire with a five-pointed star should be installed on the building at the Red Gate for the holiday. Many years later, V.M. Abramov recalled that the conversation was friendly and correct, without a hint of threats, and "more like a request from a person who really wants to give people a gift for the holiday."

Abramov later met with Beria many times and never felt any fear, and after hearing “shocking stories” about him after the arrest of Lavrenty Pavlovich, he was “quite surprised” by them. Abramov told Chigirin that in communication Beria was a polite, businesslike person, without a noble nobility. But he was very punctual and exacting in the implementation of decisions. If you can’t do something on time - report back, tell me how you need help. Lavrenty Pavlovich read construction drawings well, from the summer he delved into construction problems and, according to Abramov, he and Beria, "like engineers", "spoke the same language." In 1949, the authors of the

projects of seven high-rise buildings were awarded the Stalin Prize - even before the completion of construction. But it was not far off - the Stalinist-"Beria" "skyscrapers" were built at the "Beria" pace. Old houses stood on the territory now occupied by Moscow State University and in Zaryadye, and all those who were resettled had to be provided with new comfortable housing with all communications, infrastructure, roads and other things. One housing estate was built near the Lobnya station, the second - in Tekstilshchiki, the third in Cheryomushki - then a village 5 kilometers from Moscow, which became a new urban-type settlement in the Leninsky district of the Moscow region. Over time, Cheryomushki entered the capital, and the name "cheryomushki" became a household name for new residential areas in various cities. This cheerful name, full of joy and hope, is connected, as we see, with the work for the peoples of the USSR by Lavrenty Beria!

The high-rise buildings of Moscow are a monument to Beria for centuries, but, alas, the monument is nameless. He himself never emphasized this merit in any way, before advertising (there is no talk of self-promotion at all!) He was not eager. After his arrest, the Executive Director of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Pomaznev wrote in a note to the Central Committee dated July 2, 1953: “Beria considered high-rise buildings to be his brainchild. Once I heard him say [that] others would have been photographed ten times against the background of these buildings, but here we are building, and nothing ... ”Even urgently and petty slandering Beria, Pomaznev involuntarily noted his personal modesty. And from the same Pomaznev slander, we know: Beria proudly noted that the building of Moscow State

University "is equal to the capital of Dupont and other American billionaires." Mayakovsky said: "The Soviets have their own pride, we look down on the bourgeois." More than twenty years after it was said for the first time, after the war, after the success of RDS-1 and the construction of "skyscrapers", Beria had even more reason to feel a sense of legitimate pride both for himself, and for the state, and for its new architectural symbol!

CONTEMPORARY "iconic" skyscrapers are designed to represent prosperity, they are called so - "prestige buildings". Stalin's Beria "skyscrapers", it would seem, have a similar semantic load, but everything is more complicated. Architecture is considered "frozen music". And if so, then "prestige-buildings" are nothing more than spectacular hits. Soviet skyscrapers are great symphonies. And the difference between skyscrapers and "skyscrapers" accurately expresses the fundamental difference between the goals of socialism and capitalism. The goal of capitalism is profit. The goal of socialism is a free, comprehensively developed and educated, and therefore liberated, person. In 1943, Kaganovich, clearly

impressed by the pictures of the flourishing capital of socialist Georgia, wrote to his daughter from Tbilisi, transformed according to Beria’s plan: “Here we will end the war victoriously, the great

suffering of construction will come - the restoration of vile, barbarically, wildly destroyed cities and villages. Years of gigantic, creative construction work will pass, tens of thousands of houses, constructions of new factories, parks,

gardens ... and here the great historical role of Soviet architects will be to give socialist cities and villages. All architects need

to prepare now, today we think only about victory, we are looking for ways to destroy the enemy, but today gives birth to tomorrow, and tomorrow after the victory is a gigantic Stalinist construction ... ”This was written by Stalin’s faithful comrade-in-arms and like-

minded person Lazar Kaganovich. But the great "foreman" of socialism, Stalin's faithful comrade-in-arms and like-minded person, Lavrenty Beria, also saw the future.

“I erected a monument to myself not made by hands…,” Pushkin wrote, but he was a poet and could immortalize himself with a word. Beria was not a poet - although he was a creative, feeling nature. He could immortalize himself only by a deed, and if by a word, then only by one that immediately becomes a deed. The "high-rise buildings" that rose above the capital of the people of the Winner became not only a symbol of the hopes of millions of people, but also a man-made monument to one of those who raised these "high-rise buildings" over Moscow. It is a pity that today few people who admire the Moscow skyscrapers know about this.

The defeat is the only one, but fatal on June 26, 1953. Betrayed by his

ALL his short life, Lavrenty Beria went from victory to victory. He fought "against" - against direct and secret enemies of Soviet power, against negligence, slovenliness, laziness ... He fought "for" - for Soviet power, for oil for socialism, for a free and prosperous Georgia and for the mighty Soviet Union.

And he always

won. And he was defeated once - from his own, after the murder Stalin's Khrushchevites. But this defeat proved fatal.

By 1952, there was no longer a basis for successful conspiracies against Soviet power in the USSR - in order for it to appear, the enemies of Russia needed about forty years of painstaking "selection" and subversive work within the Khrushchev-Brezhnev society. However, by the beginning of the 1950s, a ***“nomenklatura”*** base, dangerous for the prospects of socialism, arose, consisting of that part of the party and state apparatus that turned into officials with pitcher snouts and a fishy soul. The new society was still very imperfect, and during the war the Soviet government lost millions of young, active and educated builders of socialism. The resulting voids were filled after the war by no means always worthy.

Joseph Stalin (right) with his personal assistant (more than 20 years) and the head of the special sector of the Central Committee (Stalin's Secretariat, 1928-1952), Major General Alexander Nikolaevich Poskrebyshev (1891-1965)

Stalin's last speech. XIX Congress of the CPSU. 1952

Stalin and Beria saw all the potential danger of the situation. At the XIX Party Congress in October 1952, Stalin - through the mouth of his personal secretary, head of the Special Sector of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks A.N. Poskrebysheva - said menacing words (bold italics are mine, dots in places where phrases are skipped for ease of perception are not put):

“We have among our party and Soviet workers those who for some reason are convinced that it is not they who are obliged to comply with the laws, but someone else, but that they themselves can circumvent the laws. ***From such a very strange understanding of the laws, there is only one step to a crime.*** For some reason, some leaders believe that only their subordinates are allowed to criticize, and subordinates, you see, have no right to criticize their superiors. It has nothing to do with partisanship. ***A leader who shields himself from criticism deliberately digs a gulf between himself and the masses.*** Criticism and self-criticism are not respected only by people with a bad conscience, they are either violators of party and state discipline, or despicable cowards, or pitiful philistines unworthy of bearing the high rank of party member. ***But everyone knows how severely our Party and its Central Committee punish such noblemen,***

while taking into account neither ranks, nor ranks, nor past merits ... "

Through the mouth of Poskrebyshev, Stalin did not threaten, did not frighten. He warned. But he warned seriously, in a Stalinist way. That is, first of all, with restraint. Therefore, Stalin instructed to say what was said to a trusted, but not very "status" person. Secondly, he gave a weighty warning, reminding us that with Comrade Stalin words are followed by deeds. And there was no doubt that the entire selfish "elite" understood Stalin correctly. Including smelled of resignation for Khrushchev, for the Minister of State Security Ignatiev, close to Khrushchev. But the Khrushchevites preempted Stalin, and it turned out that Stalin himself determined the date of his death - on Monday, March 2, 1953, an expanded meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was to be held, the decisions of which would change a lot for many. Stalin had been poisoned the day before, and on March 9 his state funeral took place...

And Beria?

Could not be doomed to the slaughter after the death of Stalin, his most active and original ally, who does not tolerate ***paper shifters*** of any kind: party and Soviet bureaucrats, trade union "leaders", polished "Midovites" who have tasted "Europe" and "Americas", who imagined top generals?..

On MARCH 15, 1953, the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR opened. She approved personnel appointments made in connection with Stalin's death. On March 5, 1953, when his death had not yet been announced, at a joint meeting of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Malenkov was elected Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR instead of Stalin, and his first deputies: Beria, Molotov, Bulganin and Kaganovich. Voroshilov became the formal head of state, replacing Shvernik, "recommended" by the chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Molotov was again appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR instead of Vyshinsky, Bulganin again became Minister of War instead of Marshal

Vasilevsky under the first deputies Marshal Vasilevsky and Marshal Zhukov. Mikoyan again headed the entire trade sector in the form of a unified Ministry of Internal and Foreign Trade. Former

Chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR Saburov headed the new super Ministry of Mechanical Engineering, and Pervukhin - the united Ministry of Power Plants and the Electrical Industry of the USSR.

In the sphere of party leadership, there was actually a return to the old Politburo of the Central Committee, because the Presidium of the Central Committee was reduced from 25 members with 10 candidates for members of the Presidium, elected under Stalin after the XIX Congress of the CPSU in the autumn of 1952, to 10 "post-Stalinist" members with 4 candidates. The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee were approved on March 5, 1953: Stalin (already actually deceased), Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov and Pervukhin. In fact, the party was headed by the secretary of the Central Committee Khrushchev. Beria headed the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR, merged with the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. The former Ministry of Internal Affairs remained the first deputy of Beria, the old one - still pre-war, the "cadre" of Beria Kruglov. Before the NKVD, however, he worked in the Central Committee for Malenkov, so he could also be considered his “cadre”. Khrushchev warmed up the former MGB Ignatiev in his Central Committee.

This was the internal arrangement. In the outside

world, although the world camp of socialism was taking shape, there were many problems - starting with disagreements with the leader of Yugoslavia, Tito, and ending with the war in Korea. But the USA and the USSR had atomic weapons, so that neither of the opposing sides could transfer the war of the two world camps from the "cold" phase to the "hot" phase without the risk of receiving - in the language of later times - unacceptable damage for themselves. A “nuclear stalemate” arose, and not atomic and hydrogen bombs, but ideological bombs were to be used.

Georgy Maksimilianovich Malenkov (1901-1988) - Soviet statesman and party leader, associate of I. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1953-1955)

To deprive self-seekers and hoarders of the opportunity to influence Soviet society - that was the plan of Stalin's strike, which was being prepared in early March 1953. Tyrants, bureaucrats, slobs, mediocrity and grabbers had to be cleaned out of the leading chairs - no longer with a bullet, as in the late 1930s, but with a simple kick in the ass. And among them would automatically be many of the existing or potential members of the "fifth column" of the West. Death of Stalin

mixed up all the cards and redrawn all the plans - both of Stalin himself and of his associates.

And it quickly became clear that only Beria had a conscious program for the development of Russia without Stalin. A little more than three months remained before the fall of LB, but the history of Beria's "hundred days" is the history of his continuous initiatives. He had specific proposals in all the most important areas, that is, in the field of public administration; economy; defense policy; domestic national and national policy; foreign policy. Almost all proposals required action, and therefore could not help but irritate Beria's more inert and less talented colleagues.

Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov (1890-1986) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet politician and statesman. Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR in 1930-1941, People's Commissar, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in 1939-1949, 1953-1956. One of the top leaders of the CPSU (b) and the CPSU from 1921 to 1957. Hero of Socialist Labor

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Bulganin (1895–1975) was a Soviet statesman. Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (1955-1958), first deputy since 1950, deputy since 1947, and in 1938-1944. Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. Three times - Chairman of the State Bank of the USSR (1938-1940, 1940-1945, 1958). In 1953–1955 - Minister of Defense, in 1947-1949. - Minister of the Armed Forces of the USSR. In 1937–1938 Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR.

Lazar Moiseevich Kaganovich (1893-1991) - state, economic and party leader. Candidate member of the Central Committee of the RCP(b) (1923-1924), member of the Central Committee of the Party (1924-1957), member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1924-1925, 1928-1946), secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1924-1925) , 1928–1939), candidate member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (1926–1930), member of the Politburo (Presidium) of the Central Committee (1930–1957)

Kliment Efremovich Voroshilov (1881-1969) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet military leader, one of the first Marshals of the Soviet Union (1935). In 1953-1960 - Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Hero of Socialist Labor. Voroshilov holds the record for the length of his stay in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (Central Committee of the CPSU), the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU (34.5 years)

Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan (1895-1978) - Russian revolutionary, Soviet statesman and party leader. Since 1937, deputy, in 1955-1964. First Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR. In 1926-1955 (with the exception of 1949-1953) he successively held a number of ministerial (People's Commissar until 1946) positions, mainly in the field of trade, especially foreign trade. In 1964-1965 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR

Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev (1894–1971), Soviet statesman. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU from 1953 to 1964, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from 1958 to 1964. Chairman of the Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU for the RSFSR from 1956 to 1964. Hero of the Soviet Union, three times Hero of Socialist Labor

On March 26, 1953, Beria proposed amnesty for about a million people: those convicted for up to 5 years; convicted - regardless of the term of punishment - for official, economic and some military crimes; women with children under 10 and pregnant women; minors under the age of 18; elderly men and women and patients suffering from severe

incurable ailments. Beria suggested generally softening the criminal law in terms of economic and other less dangerous crimes. It was reasonable - why pass through the “universities” the conclusions of not very stumbled and potentially law-abiding citizens? On May 13, Beria sent a note to Malenkov, where, among other things, it was said: “... if you look at the map of the

USSR, you can see that the whole country is full of regime cities and various restricted zones ... Under the current situation, citizens who have served their sentences in places of detention or exile and those who thus atoned for their guilt before society continue to experience deprivation and are doomed to ordeal.” On May 20, 1953, at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, a Resolution was adopted, which approved the draft Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, developed by Beria and removing many passport restrictions.

Указ Президиума Верховного Совета СССР
ОБ АМНИСТИИ

В результате упрочения советского общественного и государственного строя, повышения благосостояния и культурного уровня населения, роста сознательности граждан, их честного отношения к выполнению своего общественного долга укрепились законность и социалистический правопорядок, а также значительно сократилась преступность в стране.

Президиум Верховного Совета СССР считает, что в этих условиях не вызывается необходимостью дальнейшее содержание в местах заключения лиц, совершивших преступления, не представляющие большой опасности для государства, и своим добросовестным отношением к труду доказавших, что они могут вернуться к честной трудовой жизни и стать полезными членами общества.

Президиум Верховного Совета СССР **постановляет:**

1. Освободить из мест заключения и от других мер наказания, не связанных с лишением свободы, лиц, осужденных на срок до 5 лет включительно.

2. Освободить из мест заключения осужденных, независимо от срока наказания, за должностные и хозяйственные преступления, а также за воинские преступления, предусмотренные ст. ст. 193-4 п. «А», 193-7, 193-8, 193-10, 193-10 «А», 193-14, 193-15, 193-16 и 193-17 п. «А» Уголовного Кодекса РСФСР и соответствующими статьями уголовных кодексов других союзных республик.

3. Освободить из мест заключения, независимо от срока наказания, осужденных: женщин, имеющих детей в возрасте до 10 лет, и беременных женщин; несовершеннолетних в возрасте до 18 лет; мужчин старше 55 лет и женщин старше 50 лет, а также осужденных, страдающих тяжелым неизлечимым недугом.

4. Сократить наполовину срок наказания осужденным к лишению свободы на срок свыше 5 лет.

5. Прекратить производством все следственные дела и дела, не рассмотренные судами, о совершенных до издания настоящего Указа преступлениях:

а) за которые в законе предусмотрено наказание в виде лишения свободы на срок до 5 лет или другие меры наказания, не связанные с содержанием в местах заключения;

б) должностных, хозяйственных и воинских преступлениях, перечисленных в статье 2 настоящего Указа;

в) совершенных лицами, указанными в статье 3 настоящего Указа.

По другим делам о преступлениях, совершенных до издания настоящего Указа, за которые в законе предусмотрено лишение свободы на срок свыше 5 лет, суд, если признает необходимым избрать меру наказания в виде лишения свободы не свыше 5 лет, освобождает подсудимого от наказания, если же суд признает необходимым избрать меру наказания в виде лишения свободы на срок свыше 5 лет,— сокращает срок наказания наполовину.

6. Снять судимость и поражение в избирательных правах с граждан, ранее судимых и отбывших наказание или досрочно освобожденных от наказания на основании настоящего Указа.

7. Не применять амнистии к лицам, осужденным на срок более 5 лет за контрреволюционные преступления, крупные хищения социалистической собственности, бандитизм и умышленное убийство.

8. Признать необходимым пересмотреть уголовное законодательство СССР и союзных республик, имея в виду заменить уголовную ответственность за некоторые должностные, хозяйственные, бытовые и другие менее опасные преступления мерами административного и дисциплинарного порядка, а также смягчить уголовную ответственность за отдельные преступления.

Поручить Министерству юстиции СССР в месячный срок разработать соответствующие предложения и внести их на рассмотрение Совета Министров Союза ССР для представления в Президиум Верховного Совета СССР.

Председатель Президиума Верховного Совета СССР К. ВОРОШИЛОВ.

Секретарь Президиума Верховного Совета СССР Н. ПЕГОВ.

Москва, Кремль.
27 марта 1953 г.

Published at the end of March 1953 in Soviet newspapers
"Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on AMNESTY"

Poster from 1957. Unknown artist

Even before that, Beria set about the revolutionary reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs - he initiated the transfer from the Ministry of Internal Affairs to the jurisdiction of the industrial ministries of the Main Production and Economic Departments, construction departments, industrial enterprises of the Ministry of Internal Affairs with all their industrial and construction divisions, office premises, subsidiary farms, scientific and research design institutions, with material resources. Beria curtailed the economic activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in order to focus on such tasks of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which were most characteristic of him systematically. Later, Sergo Beria wrote: “Having enormous opportunities, the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the republics could become analytical bodies and work in the interests of the national economy. The party apparatus, which always knew everything, never gave a complete picture of what was happening. And the Ministry of Internal Affairs was capable of such an objective analysis. “You don’t have to chase with a gun, but think with your head,” my father said.

The Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR Beria also refused the Gulag - the Minister of Justice of the USSR Gorshenin received it in his charge.

However, these were internal, “domestic” affairs ... But Beria was no less active in the field of foreign policy - he insisted on normalizing relations with Iran and Yugoslavia, on curtailing the war in Korea. He also put forward the idea of refusing to speed up the construction of socialism in the German Democratic Republic, and was inclined towards the unification of the two Germanys. Here Beria thought the same way as Stalin. On March 10, 1952, in a note addressed to the USA, Great Britain and France, the Stalinist Soviet Union proposed to work out a peace treaty "with the direct participation of Germany in the person of the all-German government" after free all-German elections and with a guarantee of the subsequent neutrality of Germany of the Austrian type, that is, not the entry of a united Germany in NATO. Moreover! It will not be unreasonable to assume that many of Beria's post-Stalinist initiatives, both external and internal, were conceived and discussed by him with Stalin.

Some of Beria's initiatives are striking in their precise, overdue urgency! .. So, on May 9, 1953, with the "submission" of Beria, the Decree of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU "On the design of columns of demonstrators and buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on the days of state festive holidays" was adopted. The resolution ordered the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit a draft resolution of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers within two weeks, based on the following: “... refuse to decorate with portraits of columns of demonstrators, as well as buildings of enterprises, institutions and organizations on public holidays ..., cancel the practice of proclaiming appeals from the government rostrum, addressed to the demonstrators." As soon as Beria was arrested, this decision was immediately canceled! The most dangerous thing for figures like Khrushchev was that in

the sphere of public administration, Lavrenty Pavlovich took a clear course towards transferring the center for managing economic and economic activities from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Could Khrushchev and the regional party secretaries like this?

Nor was Beria's line to eliminate distortions in the Center's national policy in Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and Lithuania aroused no greater enthusiasm. In another note to the Central Committee, he wrote, referring to Western Ukraine, that "the senseless use of repression only causes discontent among the population." Beria considered the most important task to rely on loyal national cadres in the three "hot" western regions. Major General of the NKVD Pavel Sudoplatov, who knew nationalism like the back of his hand, after the death of Stalin was involved by Beria in the preparation of analytical notes with a detailed analysis of the mistakes of party organizations and state security agencies in the fight against the nationalist underground in Ukraine and Lithuania. And Sudoplatov later wrote that Beria believed: locals should be put in leadership positions, and visitors should be appointed as deputies. “He was concerned about the problem of educating a new generation of national intelligentsia, for whom socialist ideals would be truly close,” Sudoplatov reported in 1997.

WHY Beria was so active, why did he literally gush with proposals? .. He is accused of allegedly "preparing a coup", but then the reasonable line would be to hold all initiatives until he becomes head of state. After all, ***absolutely all of*** Beria's initiatives had the potential to create popularity among the people for those who put forward and implement these initiatives! A potential conspirator will behave before the plot succeeds, quieter than water, lower than grass. Why tease the geese in vain? Beria behaved in exactly the opposite way, constantly bothering his colleagues in government. Why? Yes, because he could not do otherwise. What is the

"conspiracy"? Beria has always

lived in business. As for Stalin, the construction of a mighty Socialist State was for him not only a state and moral duty, but also his only hobby. He could not but treat capitalism with sincere disdain - as a systematically petty phenomenon. Beria looked at capitalism from the height of high-rise buildings, and could Beria admire

capitalism, if only socialism made it possible to fully develop his ebullient nature? Beria became a Bolshevik-Stalinist

and to the end was a Bolshevik-Stalinist already because (although not only because!) That the main ***business*** principle of Stalinist Bolshevism was very suitable for him: “There are no such fortresses that the Bolsheviks could not take!” Oh, it was Beria's character! **And if Beria had not been killed, then even the real powerful breakthrough made by the peoples of the USSR in the first two decades after Stalin’s death from the launch pad laid down under Stalin would have turned out to be a faint resemblance to what virtual Russia could have done, the “workhorse” in which would be the best manager of the twentieth century, Lavrenty Beria.**

He did not aspire to the highest post. In July 1990, in an interview with the Georgian newspaper 7 DGE, his widow Nino Beria stated: “I knew my husband: he was a man of practical mind and understood that after the death of Stalin it was impossible for a Georgian to become the head of state. Therefore, probably, he went to meet the person he needed, such as Malenkov. But Malenkov was needed by Beria not for “blat”, but for the implementation of grandiose plans for the socialist intensification of development, the maximum use and disclosure of the powerful all-round potential of Russia, By Soviet society accumulated over the past decades.

However, Beria's state activity was abruptly, unexpectedly and treacherously interrupted on June 26, 1953, when he was arrested in the Kremlin. And it is quite symbolic, characteristic of the life and fate of Lavrenty Pavlovich, that on his last "sovereign" day, which became the day of his fall, he managed to sign his last officially registered state document. It was the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 8532ss on the approval of the design assignment for the construction of the SU-3 plant of the plant No. 406 million rubles in prices introduced from July 1, 1950.

Until the last hours of his public life, Beria was a creator, and his last actions as a statesman were directed towards the future of Russia. He lived, working for power and

heyday of the Big Country, and left his office for history, sanctioning another project that strengthens the power of the state, but, as it turned out, already without it. Then the meeting

of the Presidium of the Central Committee began, which was the last for him, and at which a decision was made - obviously with the participation of Beria - on the formation on the basis of the 1st and 3rd GU under the USSR Council of Ministers of the new "atomic" Ministry of Medium Machine Building of the USSR. And this was certainly the last “forgive me” for that case No. 1, in which Beria played such an outstanding and exciting role.

LAVRENTY Beria lived one of the most eventful and exciting lives in the entire history of the world, if you measure the intensity of life not by conquests or the number of concubines in the harem. He experienced what very few people experience. He knew how to rest and valued rest precisely because he had it so little and so rarely. He raised a wonderful son and was a wonderful son himself. He transformed his small, Caucasian, Motherland, but he received from Fate ... no, he did not receive, but ***earned*** the opportunity and the right to transform his great, great Motherland, Russia, for the better in an outstanding way.

He not only transformed Russia, but also outstandingly defended her freedom and independence in a fierce struggle against an external enemy. And then he made a primary contribution to ensuring the peaceful future of the Motherland, neutralizing the threat of its atomic destruction. He gave rise to many

sovereign projects and led their implementation. He tossed with such forces and means that no Macedonian, Napoleonic, Rockefellers, DuPonts could dream of... **He was the only one of all the world leaders of the 20th century who saw with his own eyes a mighty explosion, born of a mysterious intra-atomic energy released by man. And he not only saw it, but was one of its creators.** He lived the full life of a real person and you can talk about him

say:

There are destinies that are related
to the century, Which these
destinies create. Happy, they only
know peace.
But work is being done. All the hard work!

The wind of history blows debris from great graves—if they are great graves. This wind blows debris from the grave of the great Stalin. But there was no grave left of the great Beria. But his fate remains. And she - despite everything tragic that happened in her, one can only envy.

Afterword

Victory after defeat: by death, death is corrected ...

FAILURE in war, in struggle is called defeat. Does what happened to Lavrenty Beria on June 26, 1953, look like a defeat? Alas, yes! He fought - not for personal power, but for the strengthening, strengthening and confident development of Russia, and in this struggle he suffered a personal defeat. And yet, we have the right to talk about the posthumous victory of Beria. Victory, according to Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language, is "success in the struggle for something, accomplishment, achievement of something as a result of the struggle, overcoming something." In full accordance with this definition, today there is an increasingly convincing victory for Beria as ***overcoming the lies*** that have been built a



Секретно
экз. № 1

МВД СОЮЗНЫХ И АВТОНОМНЫХ РЕСПУБЛИК
И УМВД КРАЕВ И ОБЛАСТЕЙ

В связи с запросами с мест сообщается, что указание о повсеместном изъятии портретов Берия распространяется как на индивидуальные портреты, так и на групповые портреты, картины, репродукции, диапозитивы, диафильмы, на которых имеется изображение Берия.

Картины на холсте, исполненные маслом, а также диафильмы запрещается демонстрировать до их исправления.

НАЧАЛЬНИК II ГЛАВНОГО УПРАВЛЕНИЯ
МВД СССР

/К.ОМЕЛЬЧЕНКО/

27 июля 1953 г.
№ 46/к-2154с

Circular of the head of the 2nd Main Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR K. Omelchenko on the seizure of portraits of L.P. Beria. July 27, 1953

Khrushchev believed that he had defeated him in early July 1953 completely, finally and irrevocably. Khrushchev, first involved in betrayal Beria - in 1953, and then Stalin - in 1956, after the Twentieth Congress, other former associates of Stalin and colleagues of Beria. Khrushchev thought he had won. But can we talk about

Khrushchev’s victory, when even the spiritual “children” of the “children” of Khrushchev’s slushy “thaw” won’t say a good word about him? How do people who want historical truth look at Khrushchev? And how does an increasing number of people look at Beria?

Khrushchev believed that he forever erased Lavrenty Pavlovich from the history of the country, or at least provided him with Herostratus glory. And Beria today returns to the history of Russia. Sincere, by no means scandalous, interest in him is growing in the same way that, from a certain moment, interest in Stalin began to grow more and more. The wind of history has already swept away a lot of rubbish, with which, after Stalin's death, his majestic figure was covered, and Stalin stands before the new generations of the peoples of Russia in all his gigantic historical growth. And next to him, the figure of Beria is more and more clearly visible. He is the "first lieutenant" of Stalin, stood next to Stalin during his lifetime, and now again - decades after his death - takes his rightful historical place next to him.

What about Beria's "CRIMES"? Yes, there were no "Beria" crimes! There were tough measures necessary due to urgent historical necessity, and even then they were as minimal as ***the objectively tough*** logic of the struggle between the Good of the working majority and the Evil of the privileged minority allowed .

After the revolution, one of the first serious tasks for Beria was his appointment in October 1920 as Executive Secretary of the Extraordinary Commission for the Expropriation of the Bourgeoisie and the Improvement of the Life of the Workers. Improving the life of the workers - this was absorbed into the soul of Beria forever, and the principles learned in the young Soviet Baku became, without exaggeration, second nature for Beria. Here are some examples...

The new People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, Beria, gets acquainted with the apparatus of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD ... As the legendary in Soviet intelligence Pavel Gromushkin recalled, when he saw a very thin girl, Beria immediately asked if she was sick? And, having received a negative answer, he nevertheless gave the order to the head of the GUGB Merkulov to send the girl to a sanatorium - let her, they say, feed herself. A major Chekist Pavel

Sudoplatov makes a serious mistake, and during Beria's report, he begins to have a severe headache.

Beria immediately sends Sudoplatov home, and the next day he sends lemons to his house, brought by Beria as a gift from Georgia.

The talented young man Oleg Lavrentiev, a recent front-line sergeant, who during his military service correctly pointed out a possible version of the hydrogen bomb, and now a freshman from the Physics Department of Moscow State University, was invited to the chairman of the Special Committee of Beria. He wants to see for himself - what kind of replacement for atomic luminaries is growing? And the very first question to an extremely chubby guy: “Do you have a toothache? Maybe you need to be treated? Let's explain the question - Lavrentiev's cheeks are like those of a hamster. But if Beria were not ***automatically*** attentive to people, he would begin to care - is everything in order with the teeth of some student there?

Pavel Georgievich Gromushkin (1913-2008) - artist, Soviet intelligence officer. Since 1938 - an employee of the NKVD in the department for the preparation of documents for intelligence agents abroad (7th department of the GUGB). According to the Foreign Intelligence Service, when applying for a job in intelligence, an interview with a young employee Pavel Gromushkin was personally conducted by L.P. Beria

Physicist Julius Khariton, the future three times Hero of Socialist Labor, Chief Designer of the "atomic" KB-11, asks for a vacation. Beria authorizes, but at the same time, ***on his own initiative,*** gives an additional instruction: "Provide good treatment." This is not work "for the public," it is a need, ingrained in the flesh and blood, to delve into the interests of those for whose sake the Soviet state is called upon to exist.

Oleg Alexandrovich Lavrentiev (1926-2011) - Soviet physicist, Honored Worker of Science and Technology of Ukraine, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences. After meeting with L.P. Beria, Lavrentiev became receive an increased scholarship, instead of a hostel he was provided furnished room close to the center of Moscow. He received the right to free attendance, for him was organized literature, additional teaching of physics, mathematics and English language - the teacher of mathematics was Candidate of Sciences A.A. Samara (later - Academician and Hero of the Socialist Labor)

deleted scientific appointed

And the documented appeals of his wife film director Dovzhenko Yulia Solntseva to Beria with a request

to give moral support to her husband, who is being bullied by his colleagues? And what about the documented request of film actor Cherkasov to help promote a screenplay about Mayakovsky, the role Cherkasov dreamed of playing, at Lenfilm? Would such requests be possible if Beria had the glory of a "soulless monster" in society?

That is why it can be argued that if Beria had not been killed, and if multinational Russia had developed with the participation of Beria, it would have become an inviolably strong society with a strong social policy. Lavrenty Pavlovich could arrange a dispersal for the director of the "atomic" enterprise, who neglects social issues, and then, having arrived at the "plutonium" plant No. 817 and seeing the opposite attitude to the problem of its director Boris Muzrukov, say: "Well done!" This, too, is a feature of a business character. But also the human character. In the book

about B.G. Muzrukov, published in the series "Life of Remarkable People", recollections of an employee of Combine No. 817 (PO Mayak) from 1948 to 1960 Yu.A. Guseva: “After the execution of L.P. Beria, I plucked up courage

and turned to Muzrukov with a question: what kind of person was Lavrenty Pavlovich, how did he solve the problems of the work of the plant? Boris Glebovich told me the following story. Before one of Beria's next visits, in 1951, Muzrukov received a call from Moscow to the plant and was told that the day before, at one of the Minatom enterprises, Beria had dismissed the director for inattention to the development of the social sphere of the facility. B.G. Muzrukov, having met L.P. Beria, also suggested questions from him, primarily in the social sphere, but he asked to show the production first. Then, on the way to the hotel, he saw a construction site and asked: “What is this?” Boris Glebovich explained that there would be new houses here. And Beria said: “This is good” ... ”This is how Muzrukov described Beria ***as a person,***

after tubs of dirt were poured on the“ LP ”. The real, real Beria was the way Muzrukov described him. Beria did not know how to lisp - he was completely deprived of cheap sentimentality. But to take care of people and, if necessary, ***to sympathize*** with them, Beria knew how, and that is how he raised himself and others.

Chekist Fyodor Dmitrievich Popov was sent to the nuclear weapons development center at Arzamas-16 in 1954, when Beria was already officially ostracized. And now the operational commissioner of the "objective" department of the KGB, Captain Popov, introduces himself to the head of his department, Lieutenant Colonel V.I. Bronnikov, and a detailed conversation begins about the “atomic” history of the “object”, about the former Sarov Desert, about the features of the operational situation, and so on. The following is a direct quote:

“Bronnikov noted that Kurchatov, Khariton and Beria played a decisive role in the development of the atomic epic. “If not for them, then the atomic bomb in the USSR would hardly have been tested in 1949,”
he said".

This is an episode of 1954 (fifty-fourth!) That is, the time when Beria was declared at the highest level an agent of international capital. And the same F.D. Popov writes: “The wide deployment of activities

in KB-11 in its main profile was strictly regulated by the availability of housing ... Many specialists huddled in an overcrowded monastery hotel, which was previously used by pilgrims of the Sarov monastery.

The situation with housing changed dramatically after the intervention of Beria. On his instructions, under Department No. 880 (for the construction of a "facility" in Sarov, - S.K.) ... a specialized unit for housing construction was created. In 1948-50. many residents of Arzamas-16 celebrated housewarming. For three years, more than 200 residential buildings were occupied. They were different - and semi-detached cottages, and Finnish prefabricated panel boards, and multi-apartment stone and cobblestones. Next to the old monastic buildings stood three- and four-story houses ... "

Comments required? I

HERE think - well, who prevented those who had the same duties to the party, the state, society as Beria, to live and work like him? That is, to give all the strength of the mind and soul to the entrusted task, all your time, finally, damn it! If a large person is large in terms of opportunities and social position, a person lives the way Lavrenty Beria lived, he necessarily goes only from victory to victory - as Beria did. But how many live like this?

If they were just as active and pure as Lavrenty Beria before the people and Stalin, the People's Commissars of Internal Affairs of the USSR Yagoda and Yezhov, there would be no need to replace them, and later to arrest, interrogate, shoot ...

Alexander Petrovich Dovzhenko (1894-1956) - Soviet film director, writer, screenwriter. People's Artist of the RSFSR. Laureate of the Lenin and two Stalin Prizes.

Nikolai Konstantinovich Cherkasov (1903-1966) - Soviet theater and film actor. People's Artist of the USSR. Laureate of the Lenin and five Stalin Prizes. The film "Everything will remain to the people" (1963)

During the war, Molotov would have delved into issues of tank building the way Beria did, Stalin would not have transferred the tanks to Beria's curatorship. And Beria would not have had to take on the production of weapons and ammunition if Voznesensky had pulled them in full force.

At first, Stalin assigned the atomic problem to the same Molotov. And what is the result? As a result, the atomic scientists themselves asked for Beria's arm, and only then things went smoothly.

Why?

Yes, because Beria was not only an outstanding leader and organizer of any business entrusted to him, but he was also a great worker, busy with business as much as the job required. And all the cases entrusted to Beria took all twenty-four hours a day, if not more!

There is no doubt that this can be said not only about Beria - any major organizer of Stalin in the USSR had a huge load. Objectively, in principle, any leader in any country always has it. But how many, not in principle, but ***in fact,*** load "above the roof" not only subordinates, but also themselves? And how many are able to intelligently load at least subordinates, setting them really necessary and correct tasks? Beria knew how. Mayakovsky once wrote down

bitter lines:

“So life will pass, as the Azores sail by the islands ...” He wrote this on board a transatlantic liner, when the Azores were really visible on the horizon. In a bitter moment of life - and Beria had oh, how many of them! - Beria could remember these lines of Mayakovsky, applying them to himself. The only difference is that he had never seen the Azores, or the Bahamas, or other exotic islands… Was he in the almost round-the-clock “squirrel wheel” of the Epoch before cruises and “sexual violence”? Although ... Although it is not worth comparing his life with the "squirrel wheel" . A different image is needed here, because

Beria,

in his business whirlwind, did not run in place, but flew and flew forward, into the future. THERE IS an Eastern parable about the blind men, to whom an elephant was brought, and then

asked to describe it. One blind man, having stumbled upon a leg, said that the elephant was like a column. Another who caught the tail compared the elephant to a rope. The third, feeling the trunk, decided that the elephant was like a boa constrictor. Today's political blind people - and genuine

blind people (to this day, oddly enough, there are such), and, especially, crafty political "blind people" in quotation marks, deliberately closing their eyes to historical truth, imagine Stalin's USSR in the form of a "giant Gulag ". How vile, petty and deceitful all this is! But everything was different.

Otherwise, Stalin, otherwise

Beria ... There was a huge, daily, or rather, ***daily*** state work in many areas of the life of the state. Not a single leader of the Western world, not a single president of the largest transnational corporation, not to mention the presidents of the largest capitalist states, was anywhere near as busy as Stalin and Beria had been for decades. They did a huge amount of work, and they succeeded only because they devoted all their time to government work. They did not have hobbies, entertainment and leisure in the sense that is usually attached to these concepts. Their only "hobby" was the construction of a great Russia, existing for the prosperity and well-being of its peoples, as well as giving an example and guiding just idea to the peoples of the world.

It is unlikely that Beria himself, working for the socialist Power for fifteen or twenty hours a day, guessed what a deep and great example and lesson he would give with his life to us, living many years after his death. But this is so - there is an example of Beria, it makes sense to think, and there is something to learn here! .. Beria should be of interest to us today not only as an example of a bright fate - bright not in moving along parallels and meridians, but in the nature of the deeds. And he can and should be not only an example of a brilliant organizer today. Beria is also interesting because he professed far-sighted and promising approaches to a complex of national problems in a huge multinational state. The representative of a small, but with a great history, people, Beria deeply understood the importance for the "Ukrainian" peoples of an alliance with the great "titular" Russian nation.

Marshal of the Soviet Union Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria

Beria was not a noted speaker, he did not like to "speak beautifully", but he knew how to say it very well. In his speech at a mourning meeting on the day of Stalin's funeral, the refrain strikes: **“Whoever is not blind,** he sees that our party, in difficult days for it, closes its ranks even more closely, that it is united and unshakable. **Whoever is not blind** sees that in these mournful days, all the peoples of the Soviet Union, in fraternal unity with the great Russian people, rallied even more closely around the Soviet government and the Central Committee of the Communist Party ... ” Of the three speakers then, two of whom, Molotov and Malenkov, were Russians, only the Georgian Beria did not forget to say about the Russian people.

Working in Moscow, Beria solved all-Union tasks. But after all, he worked in Georgia in such a way that the results of his work were important and useful not only for Georgia, but also for all of Russia, the entire USSR! He won a lot and often due to his mind, energy, faith in people, and only once was he defeated, or rather, betrayed. But in the end, he won anyway - he trampled down death with death!

In 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for the glory of which and in the name of whose power Lavrenty Beria won victories, was defeated. Homeland of Stalin and Beria from Russia
broke off.

So - Beria worked and lived in vain? Well,
the answer to this question is for us, now living. And you have to answer it correctly.